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Africa needs a strong development 
bank; the ADB should be that bank. Its 
mission should be poverty reduction and 
development by promoting growth and 
economic integration. The ADB itself 
can have only one driving goal: to be 
the premier development institution in 
Africa. It is not that now and will not be 
immediately; it must first prove itself. It 
should grow over time according to a well 
sequenced plan but must now focus its 
resources and energies on those areas 
that will contribute most to its mission.
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When Donald Kaberuka asked us to lead the High Level 
Panel considering the future of the African Development 
Bank (ADB) and its role in ensuring Africa’s success, 
we were honored to accept, struck by the implications 
of the undertaking, and eager to make a significant 
contribution to an institution on whom so many rely.
We have been fortunate to count as colleagues on 
the panel an eminent group of leaders from around the 
world who possess a tremendous depth and breadth of 
expertise in such diverse realms as the private sector, 
public service, academia, and international development. 
All share a heartfelt passion for the future of Africa and a 
strong commitment to the well-being of its people.
With its young and growing population and vast 
natural resources wealth, Africa could become a 
global economic success and a land of great promise 
for millions. The continent has enormous potential to 
succeed, but this potential has existed for generations. 
We are all sadly familiar with the story that is Africa: 
persistent poverty, ongoing conflict, lack of economic 
Foreword
union, unacceptable corruption, and the scourge of 
AIDS have all conspired to rob its people of the future so 
many others in the rest of the world take for granted. 
We believe the ADB can and must become the 
premier development institution in Africa, providing a 
strong voice for and within Africa so that Africans can 
take their rightful place at the forefront of continental 
economic stewardship. With an elected African 
president, strong balance sheet, and representation in all 
African countries, the ADB is well positioned to do this. 
There is a compelling case why the ADB must assume 
this role, and we present a realistic and credible plan to 
achieve it.
Realizing the promise contained in this report 
will require collaboration, increased commitment of 
resources, and determination to overcome the inevitable 
obstacles. The challenge today is for shareholders and 
regional member countries to decide whether they 
share our vision for the ADB and, if so, to fully engage in 
making it a reality. 
  Joachim Chissano  Paul Martin
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Africa is on the move. Policy changes and improved 
governance and management have led to the 
highest rates of sustained growth since the days of 
independence. The proportion of the population in 
extreme poverty is no longer increasing; democratic 
change is becoming the norm; African-led efforts have 
reduced conflict. The global context is also favorable, 
with the large emerging economies creating new 
opportunities for Africa. More African countries are 
credit-worthy, and investment has increased. All this 
gives cause for optimism. The High Level Panel believes 
that Africa has its best chance in a generation to make 
rapid progress—an opportunity that must be seized.
By 2030 Africa will be as populous as China and India today. It 
should be a stable, integrated, and more prosperous continent taking 
its proper place in the global community. But this outcome is not 
inevitable. To succeed, Africa will have to overcome poverty, disease, 
climate change, failing and fragile states, corruption, poor governance, 
and small, unproductive, uncompetitive economies. If the continent 
fails, another generation of Africans will be trapped in poverty with few 
opportunities to escape.
The High Level Panel’s position can be summarized as follows. 
To reduce poverty Africa needs sustained and shared growth, driven 
by the private sector, with a more equal distribution of opportunities. 
Operating as 53 fragmented economies, Africa will never be able 
to trade competitively—it needs to be more integrated, with larger 
economic spaces. Goods and services must move more easily; 
infrastructure must facilitate not frustrate trade; institutions must be 
supportive and effective. Without integration, the continent will remain 
disjointed, with many small, shallow markets that are uncompetitive on 
their own and unattractive to investors. Underpinning this integration 
are capable states, offering good and accountable governance. 
Progress, or the lack of it, will be closely related to success in rebuilding 
post-conflict states and managing fragile situations.
There is no single development model to apply. Uneven progress 
has made Africa more diverse, not less. There are more middle 
income countries (MICs) and more countries aspiring to MIC status. 
All, rightly, want to take responsibility for their destiny, to move away 
from dependence on aid. For this, Africa will need strong, committed 




















The ADB has a clear mission: poverty 
reduction and development through 
growth and economic integration
support from the international community. Commitments 
by African countries and by donors need to be translated 
into action.
Africa will also need appropriate continental 
institutions. The African Union is providing a political 
lead, but the continent needs an economic motor 
to facilitate implementation on the ground, to drive 
economic integration. The African Development 
Bank (ADB) must become that motor, as the premier 
development institution in Africa. It must be a voice for 
development in Africa and for Africa internationally. This 
is a message we heard loud and clear in our discussions 
with African stakeholders—and it is the bedrock for the 
rest of our report.
The Bank has a clear mission: poverty reduction and 
development through growth and economic integration. 
It has the right credentials: an elected African president, 
universal African membership, an exclusive focus on 
African development, and a strong presence on the 
continent, including its headquarters and growing 
network of country offices. And it can address the full 
range of Africa’s challenges by supporting public and 
private initiatives across the continent.
But the ADB is not yet there. It has human and 
financial constraints. It has lacked focus in its wide-
ranging agenda. It has not been as effective as it should 
be. Even so, we are impressed by recent progress and 
by the dedication of management to realize the Bank’s 
potential. We also recognize that the ADB cannot 
claim premier status as a right. It must earn its place 
by delivering results, by demonstrating excellence, by 
showing that it adds value, by becoming an efficient and 
dynamic organization. This will not happen overnight. 
It will require focus on carefully sequenced reforms 
and growth. And it will require concerted support from 
shareholders and management.
The Bank has to be relevant to all its regional 
member countries. It must be much more than a conduit 
for aid. It must have the right instruments. It must be an 
essential part of the African architecture, together with 
the African Union. It must support African-led strategies, 
taking a longer term view of what works, providing 
knowledge and advisory services as well as finance 
for productive investments. And it must provide an 
African perspective, generating knowledge in Africa, for 
Africans, responding to African concerns. 
The Bank cannot work just at the national level. 
It must ensure that cities and towns have access to 
finance. It must also lend to the private sector. With 
economic integration as a prime objective, financing 
regional projects should be a distinguishing feature 
of Bank operations. Neither the ADB nor any other 
institution can adequately cover all of Africa’s diverse 
needs. Choices have to be made, and priorities 
established and maintained.
Nor can the Bank work in isolation. It must leverage 
its knowledge and resources through partnerships with 
other institutions and other donors. Otherwise there will 
be duplicated efforts and weak coordination. Leveraging 
through partnerships is not easy—it will require self-
discipline on the part of shareholders and management. 
Four interlocking flagship areas of focus
We believe that the ADB should now concentrate its 
resources and efforts on four interlocking flagship areas of 
focus, all essential for growth and economic integration: 
investing in infrastructure, building capable states, 
promoting the private sector, and developing skills.
Investing in infrastructure
Africa will never become competitive, or realize its 
productive potential, without massive improvements in 
infrastructure. The needs are huge, variously estimated 
at $20–30 billion a year. The cost penalties borne 
now by the private sector, particularly for transport 
and energy, are daunting, more than wiping out any 
comparative advantages Africa might have in, say, lower 
labor costs. Infrastructure is a precondition for, and an 
enabler of, growth, for private sector development, and 
for trade. And support to infrastructure will contribute 




















The ADB should concentrate its resources 
and efforts on investing in infrastructure, 
building capable states, promoting the 
private sector, and developing skills
The ADB already has solid experience in 
infrastructure, and it has generally performed well. It 
has a mandate from the African Union to implement the 
infrastructure component of the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and leads several multi-
donor initiatives. It must be more proactive and take more 
leadership in defining needs and priorities, designing 
strategies and action plans, bringing stakeholders 
together, and coordinating and managing implementation. 
It should help Africa build infrastructure to effectively 
mitigate and adapt to climate change through clean 
energies (hydro and wind power), all-weather transport, 
and irrigation projects. More of the resources available for 
infrastructure should be channeled through the ADB.
We include “soft” infrastructure, the investments 
to promote trade and integration and to remove the 
impediments imposed at borders, by regulations, and 
by inefficient services. We believe that more resources 
must be devoted to regional cross-border infrastructure. 
The ADB should maximize its own contribution by 
mobilizing more resources for integration, including 
grants and loans through its African Development Fund 
(ADF) and through a new solidarity fund to which African 
countries themselves and other donors could contribute. 
There should also be positive incentives for integration, 
including concessional finance for projects that create 
positive regional returns. 
Building capable states
With effective and accountable institutions essential 
for sustained economic growth and social progress, 
building capable states must be at the heart of the 
ADB’s work. Engaging in fragile and post-conflict states 
is an imperative, not an option. The Bank should have a 
leading role but intervene selectively, consistent with its 
other areas of focus. Its assistance must be flexible, fast, 
and consistent, well coordinated with other players. And 
additional financial and human resources will have to be 
directed accordingly. 
The Bank should strengthen institutions responsible 
for financial management and the use of public 
resources—and the oversight bodies and systems that 
hold them to account. It should build on the engagement 
with the African Peer Review Mechanism and on 
implementing the recommendations. It must have a zero 
tolerance for corruption in its own operations and in 
the use of resources it provides, taking immediate and 
decisive action when required.
Promoting the private sector
The private sector will drive growth in Africa. The ADB 
can help it do so by promoting an enabling environment, 
by facilitating investment and entrepreneurship. That 
means listening to the private sector, lending directly 
to private interests, and helping governments reform 
their legal and regulatory frameworks to strengthen 
governance and accountability. The ADB must better 
exploit the advantages of its integrated structure, 
building up country and regional strategies that 
encompass both the private and public sectors and 
foster the synergies between them.
Direct private sector operations tripled in the last 
year and should grow further. The Bank must draw 
in other financiers and take on some risk where the 
development returns for Africa are high. Doing so will 
put a premium on having the right skills and capacity 
in-house. Again, the ADB must add value. We believe 
that direct lending should focus on infrastructure, 
on agriculture and agri-business, on the extractive 
industries to help Africa get more from its natural 
resources, and on financial services.
Developing skills
The ADB should help Africa build the skills it needs to 
be competitive. In 2030 half of Africans will be under 
25. Africa will have transitioned to a primarily urban 
population. Only economic growth can provide Africans 
with opportunities—but if they are to grasp these 
opportunities, they will need the right skills. 
Given the heavy involvement of other donors 
in primary and basic education, the ADB should 



















The ADB should become the recognized 
authority on African development, a credible 
and respected voice for Africa and within Africa
and science and technology. The priorities should be 
building centers of excellence, providing the necessary 
infrastructure for education, and developing mutually 
supportive links with the private sector to promote the 
use of local skills.
Moving forward
It is not enough to define areas of focus. Of equal 
importance is building the Bank’s capacity to deliver. 
The president has begun a program of reform. More is 
needed. The ADB must better integrate its operations 
and develop an appropriate array of instruments. And to 
be more responsive to the needs of its diverse clients, 
the ADB and ADF should be brought together to tailor 
lending accordingly, operating as a single bank with a 
single board.
There is scope for blending ADB and ADF resources, 
consistent with the sustainability of debt and taking into 
account the quality and productivity of investments. The 
Bank sits on considerable financial capacity. Its triple-
A-rated balance sheet could be used more productively 
to support the continent’s development objectives—for 
instance by making transfers from middle income to 
ADF-eligible countries, blending lending rates, and 
increasing subsovereign lending. The Bank should 
explore these options urgently, calling on external 
expertise as needed.
We believe that good country performance must 
be encouraged and rewarded but that the ADF’s 
aid allocation system has weaknesses that must be 
corrected. The ADB should develop a rigorous and well 
evidenced African model of aid allocation.
The ADB must increasingly provide expertise, 
experience, and advice to its members. We believe 
in the competition of ideas. Too often, however, the 
African perspective is absent or neglected. The ADB 
should become the recognized authority on African 
development, the hub of a network for African policy and 
research, building understanding of what works in Africa 
and why—of how policies and investments translate 
into outcomes. This becomes increasingly important 
as donors focus less on preconditions to giving aid and 
more on results on the ground. The ADB must become 
more self-confident, able to act as a credible and 
respected voice for Africa and within Africa.
The aid architecture is changing radically with 
more donors and new players, including well endowed 
single-purpose and philanthropic funds. These positive 
developments are creating new opportunities. But they 
also put immense pressure on many African countries 
that do not have institutional capability to manage donor 
relationships, putting the country-led model under 
threat. The ADB should position itself to support African 
countries in managing and coordinating assistance, in 
accordance with their own priorities.
If the Bank is to become Africa’s premier 
development institution, it must grow. Compared with 
similar institutions and indeed some bilateral donors, 
it is significantly understaffed and stretched too thin. 
Shareholder commitment to a cogent longer term 
vision for the Bank will be critical. Management and 
shareholders should develop a medium-term strategic 
accord that provides additional resources linked to 
specific deliverables and to performance. Without that 
accord, the Bank will be caught in the trap of not having 
enough resources to deliver what its shareholders want 
and of being denied additional resources on the grounds 
that it is not delivering.
The opportunity is waiting. Africa needs to have 
a strong African Development Bank as a recognized 
leader on the continent, driving economic integration 
and growth, building African expertise and knowledge. 















Africa can make faster progress and take its rightful 
place in a globalized world. The fundamentals are in 
place in many countries. Performance is better now 
than over the last three decades. Commitments of 
support are substantial. It is up to Africa and its leaders 
to seize and benefit from this window of opportunity.
A vision for Africa in 2030
The High Level Panel is motivated by an optimistic vision of what 
Africa can be in 2030. This is inspired by Africa’s recent progress 
and by Asia’s considerable achievements over the past several 
decades. We believe that Africa can transform itself into a stable, 
integrated, and prospering continent of competitive, diversified, and 
growing economies. Taking its rightful place in the world, it will be 
a continent with strong, integrated domestic markets, participating 
fully in global trade and investment. Peace and democracy will have 
taken hold in many more countries, underpinned by transparent and 
accountable governance. Borders will not be a barrier to trade, and 
subregions will be more integrated politically and economically. Driving 
this transformation will be skills, institutions, entrepreneurship, and 
community and individual empowerment.
Like Asia before, Africa will have reduced mass poverty 
substantially from the more than 40% today. More Africans will have 
access to clean water and sanitation, and they will enjoy better health, 
especially mothers and children. The major pandemics will be largely 
under control, thanks to stronger health systems and greater access to 
prevention and treatment. AIDS and tuberculosis will be in decline, and 
at least half the continent will be malaria-free.
With more than 1.5 billion people in 2030, Africa will be as populous 
as China or India. Africa’s young people will be well schooled and well 
trained for good jobs. More than half will live in towns. Most will be 
employed, many in manufacturing and services, some in “South-South” 
ventures. African workers will be driving the continent’s progression, 
with a vibrant private sector offering them good opportunities. 
Agricultural productivity will be much higher, increasing value addition, 
allowing greater crop diversification and exports, and bolstering food 
security. A slowdown in population growth will mean fewer dependents 
per worker and higher per capita incomes for viable futures. Men and 
women will have equal access to assets and opportunities.
Africa in 2030 will have overcome the economic barriers of long 





















































We are optimistic because 
conditions in Africa are more propitious 
today than in recent memory
China’s land area, Africa will be one vast economic 
space, with highways connecting East and West, 
North and South, and with easy air travel to all the 
continent’s capitals. Efficient transport networks and 
effective logistics systems will have slashed the cost of 
moving goods and workers, allowing the development 
of domestic markets, boosting trade within Africa, 
and enabling African firms to compete internationally. 
Reliable interconnected electricity grids will supply clean 
energy, powering human and business development.
Modern communications networks will reach towns 
everywhere, even many small villages, connecting 
Africans and plugging them into the world—giving 
them the information they need to work, to improve 
their lives, and to hold their governments to account. 
Economic integration at the continental level will be led 
by the African Union and at the regional level by regional 
economic communities (RECs) aligned with continental 
objectives.
With integrated markets, a well trained workforce, 
and indirect costs massively reduced by new 
infrastructure and the removal of bureaucratic 
constraints, Africa will have built its competitive 
advantage on lower-cost technically skilled labor. Good 
risk-adjusted rates of return and business opportunities 
will mobilize domestic resources and attract external 
investment. Africa’s need for foreign development 
assistance will be greatly reduced. Access to finance 
on reasonable terms will be the norm not the exception, 
including that for small enterprises, women, rural 
populations, and micro entrepreneurs.
Supporting the continent’s rapid and sustained 
economic transformation will be the adoption of new 
technologies: those that combat ill health, those that 
produce more crops per unit of land and water, and 
those that reduce, indeed reverse, environmental stress. 
Climate change adaptation and mitigation will be an 
integral part of continental development strategies.
Governments will have a long-term view of the 
sustainable exploitation of natural resources. They will 
have fully developed the capacity and skills to negotiate 
better deals with investors. Contracts will be open to 
scrutiny, and governments will make better use of the 
revenues received for the benefit of all citizens. Africans 
will demand transparency and hold their governments 
to account. Local communities will be consulted and 
involved as key stakeholders and beneficiaries of natural 
resource exploitation.
That is what Africa can and should be, but getting 
there is not automatic. Asia’s experience shows that it 
is possible, but Africa in the last century shows that it is 
not inevitable.
Why we are optimistic
We are optimistic because conditions in Africa are more 
propitious today than in recent memory. For the first time 
in at least a quarter century, growth in the number of 
poor people has been arrested. Gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth, strong over the past several years, 
is forecast to remain so (figure 1). A favorable world 
economic context has helped, as has the emergence 
of new trading partners and South-South cooperation. 
Africa’s macroeconomic reform and stabilization efforts 
have created a more favorable business climate. 
Indeed, nearly all of Africa’s macroeconomic indicators 
are already positive: inflation, international currency 
reserves, fiscal management, and debt ratios all show 
encouraging trends (figures 2–5). 
Clearly Africa’s strong economic performance is 
driven in part by higher prices for many commodities, 
particularly oil. But this is only part of the story. Fifteen 
non-oil-producing countries, home to more than one third 
of Africa’s people, have grown at an average of more than 
4.5% over the past year1 (further detail in annex 1).
Africa is also moving toward greater stability and 
stronger governance. The African Union and the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), a broadly 
accepted sustainable development initiative, are key 
elements of the emerging regional architecture. The 
NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is 
an example of Africa’s desire for better governance 























































































Real GDP growth is strong
Figure   
1
























External debt is declining
Figure   
3





























































African budgets are better balanced
Figure   
2















































Inflation has been dropping steadily
Figure   
4






















































But progress in many countries remains 
fragile, and the risk of policy reversal is real
The mechanism can be improved, but it is the only 
peer-driven initiative in the world today. Government 
transparency and accountability, particularly in the 
management of public expenditures, are increasing. 
Armed conflicts have declined. Democratic transitions 
are becoming the norm.
The big challenges Africa must address
Of course, the picture is mixed, with the average 
disguising wide variations. Disparities in economic 
performance are increasing as individual countries 
respond differently to today’s challenges and 
opportunities. Progress in many countries remains 
fragile, and the risk of policy reversal is real. In contrast 
to our vision of what Africa could be, the picture of an 
Africa in 2030 that has not addressed its challenges and 
seized its opportunities is desolate. Today’s progress 
would be remembered as just the upswing of another 
boom-bust commodity cycle. The continent would be 
fragmented and uncompetitive, cut off from the global 
economy. Its mineral riches would be exploited, with the 
profits going into the pockets of a few. Climate change 
would have increased competition for scarce land and 
water resources, increasing famine and fanning the 
flames of conflict. Population growth and urbanization 
would create vast slums, and poverty would become 
an increasingly urban phenomenon. With precious few 
opportunities, Africa’s children would be condemned to 
an uncertain and limited future, their potential wasted.
We nevertheless believe that the continent can 
overcome its tremendous development challenges. But 
this will take time and concerted effort. If our vision of 
a successful Africa is to be realized, the following key 
challenges must be addressed urgently:
Overcome pervasive and persistent poverty.  •	
Although poverty has leveled off, it remains 
unacceptably high across the continent. There 
are still some 300 million Africans living on less 
than $1 a day.2 No Sub-Saharan country is likely 
to meet the Millennium Development Goal of 
halving poverty by 2015. There is a real risk of a 
widening gap between Africa and the rest of the 
world.
Build stronger states.  •	 Africa scores poorly in 
international governance comparisons. Many 
countries don’t ensure political rights and 
civil liberties.3 Although corruption is a global 
phenomenon, perceptions of corruption are 
particularly high across Africa and are correlated 
with poverty.4 The prevalence of fragile states 
in Africa imposes significant costs not just on 
these states but on their neighbors. Civil war and 
regional conflicts have weakened many states, 
and ongoing conflicts continue to threaten 
regional peace and stability.
Increase productivity.  •	 With abundant natural 
resources and burgeoning human capital, 
Africa should be a major beneficiary of 



























The debt service ratio is improving
Figure   
5





















































African leaders and the African people 
must seize the moment. Africans cannot 
be content with today’s progress
lower than elsewhere. African economies 
are not competitive because they lack 
infrastructure, skills, institutions, and technology. 
Poor infrastructure leads to power outages, 
communication problems, and logistics delays 
that significantly increase the costs for African 
firms. Energy costs for firms in some African 
countries are 6% of total costs, six times those 
in such emerging countries as China.5 Internal 
transport costs are at least twice those in Asia 
and Latin America. The result: smaller African 
firms, unable to compete internationally.
Overcome economic fragmentation.  •	 Africa has 
more states than any other continent. Its small, 
fragmented, and shallow markets (the average 
national GDP is about $4 billion) do not offer 
economies of scale. Many African countries 
must overcome geographic handicaps: 40% 
of Africans live in landlocked countries with no 
access to the sea. These countries are among 
the world’s poorest performing economies, with 
a significant and widening development gap with 
their coastal neighbors. Africa’s share of world 
trade has plummeted to a little more than 1%, 
and intra-African trade is low, only about 10% 
of total African trade. Foreign direct investment 
flows into Africa have declined to insignificant 
levels compared with other developing regions. If 
these trends continue unchecked, Africa will be 
cut off from the benefits of expanding world trade 
and investment, stuck on a low growth path.
Support growing populations.  •	 According to the 
United Nations, Africa’s population will reach 
1.5 billion by 2030, on par with both China and 
India, and 2 billion by 2050. By 2030 more than 
half its population will be under the age of 25 and 
the majority of people will live in urban areas, 
marking the transition from a primarily agrarian, 
rural continent. Only strong economic growth 
can create jobs for the millions of new workers 
entering the labor force each year. And only good 
educational opportunities will produce a young 
workforce with relevant technical and managerial 
skills. Africa will need robust social systems and 
urban infrastructure to provide basic services and 
avoid the growth of urban slums.
Sustain natural resources.  •	 Population growth 
and climate change will put pressure on Africa’s 
land and water resources. Although not of 
its own making, increased climate variability 
already adversely affects its water resources, 
land, forests, and biodiversity. Continuous 
climate changes will threaten food security and 
foster disease and migration. Africa must also 
manage its commodity resources for maximum 
economic impact and diversification. Africa is 
not getting the full value for its resources, and 
it is depleting the value for future generations. 
Striking examples include Sierra Leone and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, where 
considerable commodity exports generate a 
pittance in royalties for the country.6 
Deal with disease.  •	 It is estimated that AIDS 
claimed 1.6 million lives in Sub-Saharan Africa 
in 2007. The epidemic, having already left more 
than 11 million orphans across the continent, is 
reversing decades of progress in lengthening 
the life expectancy of Africans.7 Tuberculosis 
is second only to AIDS as a cause of illness 
and death for adults, with 2.4 million cases and 
540,000 deaths each year.8 Malaria continues 
to plague the continent, preying particularly on 
children and the poor.
Africa must provide leadership, take ownership
To realize the Panel’s vision, African leaders and the 
African people must seize the moment. Africans cannot 





















































A strong continental development 
bank should be the motor for 
development and integration in Africa, 
and the ADB must be that motor
stepping-stone to a higher level of success. Africa must 
take the lead in setting the development agenda and 
in designing the policies and programs to develop and 
transform Africa. African leaders must raise their sights—to 
pursue what will be in the continent’s best interests and 
their countries’—by accepting short-term tradeoffs for 
longer term benefits. They must give substance to African 
Union principles on economic integration.
African leaders have to position their countries to 
make the best use of resources. They must strengthen 
public finance management systems to get results. 
Their budgets should direct domestic resources 
and increased foreign aid and investment to growth-
enhancing areas and opportunities. With the right 
policies, including public interventions to stimulate 
investment, it should also be possible to increase the 
share of private investment in GDP, critical to sustaining 
growth over the medium and long terms.
African leaders should also be more assertive 
in managing their international relationships—taking 
charge, not passively taking what is decided elsewhere. 
Africa will need foresight, longer term strategies, and 
better program delivery. The continental and regional 
institutions should work within a comprehensive, 
coordinated, and coherent program of action. Stepping 
up to the next level requires genuine and more equal 
partnerships between Africa and the international 
community, with more space for African leadership and 
ownership.
The strategic role of institutions serving Africa should 
be framed accordingly. The African Union and its NEPAD 
program provide the broad policy objectives, but these 
institutions are not implementing agents. A strong 
continental development bank should be the motor for 
development and integration in Africa, and the ADB 










o The ADB in the 
21st century
Africa needs a strong development bank—the ADB should 
be that bank. Its mission should be poverty reduction 
and development by promoting growth and economic 
integration. The ADB itself can have only one driving goal: 
to be the premier development institution in Africa. But 
it is not that now, and it will not be immediately. It must 
first prove itself. It should grow over time according to a 
well sequenced plan, focusing its resources and energies 
on the areas that will contribute most to its mission.
The role of multilateral development banks has been called into 
question recently, especially with the improved access to capital 
markets for many developing countries. However, the situation in Africa 
is different. Because of its huge development challenges, Africa more 
than any other region needs a premier continental development bank:
To underpin economic integration and, particularly, to undertake  •	
multinational investments where the regional returns are greater 
than those for any individual country and which may otherwise 
not be financed.
To provide a range of regional public goods, particularly  •	
knowledge and advisory services, to transfer experience and 
best practice, and to be an African voice on development 
internationally.
To channel development capital efficiently to all African  •	
countries on reasonable and predictable terms to finance their 
investment needs.
These tasks are far from easy. A continental development bank must 
be efficient and effective; it must also demonstrate where and how it 
can add value. It must be agile and proactive, attracting and retaining 
the talent it needs to deliver high-quality results for its clients. It should 
have a convening role, assembling the key players, taking the lead 
when appropriate. It should also have legitimacy in Africa, being 
relevant to all its countries and answerable to Africa. 
We feel strongly that the ADB should become that bank. It has the 
right credentials: it is wholly focused on the development of Africa—all 
of Africa. It is based in Africa, and it has an increasing country presence 
through a growing network of 23 field offices. It engages with the 
full range and complexity of development challenges in Africa. It has 
integrated operations, lending directly to the public and private sectors. 






























The ADB has to be, and remain, relevant 
to all of its regional member countries, from 
MICs to fragile and post-conflict states
and staff are African. It thus brings a uniquely African 
experience and perspective.
It also has legitimacy in Africa. Unlike some other 
international financial institutions, the president is 
democratically elected and has the confidence of, 
and ready access to, African heads of state and other 
high-level political leaders, engaging them on sensitive 
matters of policy and politics. The Bank can foster a 
unique African voice on development issues across the 
continent and internationally.
Therefore the Panel’s unequivocal and unanimous 
view is that the ADB must become the premier 
development bank for Africa. It cannot assert this as 
a right; it will need to earn it by excellence in what it 
does and by delivering results, by helping to increase 
economic growth and to reduce poverty. It has to 
be, and remain, relevant to all of its regional member 
countries, from MICs to fragile and post-conflict states. 
It must maximize its impact by working in partnership, 
particularly with other African institutions. This 
means truly collaborating with national and regional 
development programs. In some cases the ADB should 
take the lead. In others it may be appropriate to be an 
equal partner or to cede lead responsibilities to other 
partners.
We know the ADB is not there today, nor will it be 
there tomorrow. The Bank operates in a complex and 
competitive international aid environment. It survived 
a fundamental crisis in the 1990s, which eroded 
its financial strength and shareholder confidence. 
As a result, the Bank’s voice has been muted. It is 
comparatively small, with financial and human resource 
constraints. Its portfolio is disparate and the quality 
mixed. And procedure bound, it has been quite 
inflexible. 
But the ADB is improving. It has instituted profound 
reforms over the past ten years that have strengthened 
internal controls, modernized risk management, and 
restored its financial health. The ADB now has one of 
the strongest balance sheets of any of the multilateral 
development banks. We are impressed by the Bank’s 
new management, by the leadership shown, and by the 
sense of strategic direction. It is putting in place policies 
and programs that respond to the remaining challenges. 
Even so, the ADB has much to do to become the 
channel of choice for development finance in Africa. 
Enhancing the confidence of its shareholders and 
earning the space and resources it needs to be more 
effective will take time and tenacity. It must build the 
capabilities of its staff, deepening and broadening its 
knowledge base. It must review its instruments and be 
more flexible and responsive.
We believe that our view of building the ADB into 
Africa’s premier development bank has broad support 
across the continent. The increasing fragmentation in 
the aid architecture makes the Bank more relevant, 
not less. Africans told us that they want to reduce 
the burden imposed by a large number of donors 
with separate systems and demands. They want 
predictable multi-year funding that respects national 
priorities. They also want a source of technical advice, 
of knowledge and experience that can bring partners 
together. All want more resources channeled through 
an organization that is part of Africa, that understands 
and lives in Africa, and that is accountable to its 
member states. In other words they want to channel 
more resources through a stronger, more effective ADB. 
Donors talk about African ownership; they should listen 
to Africa’s views.
Its mission—poverty reduction 
and development through growth 
and economic integration
The Bank’s mission must be to promote economic 
development and poverty reduction. We believe this 
can best be accomplished by promoting broad-based 
growth and economic integration. The links among 
growth, inequality, and poverty reduction are well 
established: growth is a primary driver of poverty 
reduction. But there is considerable variation across 
countries: not all trade leads to increased growth, and 






























The multifaceted challenges in Africa 
defy a single prescription. What is needed 
is a nuanced approach, tailored to the 
particular needs of each country
To have a positive impact on poverty, growth must 
be structured to be inclusive, creating income-earning 
opportunities for all groups in society, including women, 
youth, and the rural poor—largely bypassed to date. This 
means developing vibrant domestic markets that provide 
opportunities for local entrepreneurs in a variety of 
sectors to add value, to expand and create jobs. When 
growth is driven only by export-oriented operations 
with limited economic spillover (for job creation and 
knowledge transfer), there are results on paper, but 
precious little impact on the wider economy. The bulk of 
African countries are agriculture-based, and poverty in 
Africa is primarily rural. To have the greatest impact on 
poverty, growth strategies in Africa will have to promote 
higher agricultural productivity. They must also give more 
attention to empowering women as a way of promoting 
faster, more inclusive growth.
There is no universally applicable model of how to 
get countries onto the path of rapid sustained growth. 
Effective strategies to manage geographic and resource 
endowments are important, as are policy stability 
and the effective and accountable institutions of a 
capable state. One of the criticisms of the Washington 
Consensus is that it has been applied without enough 
appreciation of the different country circumstances and 
of the social, political, and institutional realities. It is clear 
that the multifaceted challenges in Africa defy a single 
prescription. What is needed is a nuanced approach, 
tailored to the particular needs of each country, sensitive 
to their economic, political, and social circumstances, 
proceeding through dialogue, supporting country 
ownership, and rewarding success. If the African 
Development Bank is not able to do that, who can?
Greater regional economic integration in Africa has a 
clear development rationale (see annex 2). It is the best 
way for Africa to overcome the challenges of economic 
fragmentation and low productivity—by building larger 
and more competitive economic spaces conducive to 
intra-African and global trade and attractive to domestic 
and foreign investors. Economic integration also has a 
positive effect on regional peace and stability by creating 
structures of cooperation and interdependence that 
become strong disincentives to cross-border conflict. 
The Bank, as an African institution, is well positioned 
to lead and to accelerate economic integration. It has a 
responsibility to the African Union and NEPAD to help 
frame priorities and bring regional institutions together 
behind a common continental agenda.
Economic integration should be a prime policy 
objective for the Bank and a distinguishing feature of 
its programs. Financing regional projects that promote 
integration should be a major component of the Bank’s 
operations. Designing and managing such projects is 
inherently complicated, requiring strong coordination 
across different political and institutional contexts. They 
often take ten years or more to implement and need 
secure funding over that period.
Financing regional investments is one way to 
promote integration. The Bank can add value by 
supporting regional projects in a variety of sectors that 
include infrastructure (especially roads, energy, and 
water) and regional public goods (health, knowledge, 
and environmental preservation). But it must also provide 
broader support to the integration agenda: improving 
governance, strengthening the RECs, nurturing regional 
capital markets, and promoting trade. Currently many of 
the RECs have limited capability and weak track records. 
There is overlap and duplication among the RECs and 
little effective coordination among them. African Union 
discussions on rationalizing their structure are making 
slow progress. Only the RECs that provide the most 
value to their members will flourish.
Consistent with the drive for economic integration 
and higher productivity, we recommend that the Bank 
provide more, but selective, financial and capacity-
building support to the RECs. (We note that the recent 
G8 Summit in Germany reached the same conclusion.) 
We are already seeing faster progress in East and West 
Africa where countries perceive common interests. 
Progress toward customs unions and common external 
tariffs in some RECs, such as the Southern African 






























The ADB cannot do everything, and 
tough choices will have to be made
for Eastern and Southern Africa, will force countries to 
make choices. The Bank’s job should be to promote and 
support RECs that are providing value to their members.
Making tough choices, selecting priorities
The ADB cannot do everything, and tough choices will 
have to be made. In the past, stakeholders have tended 
to ask the ADB to work across the full spectrum of 
development challenges. This has strained the ADB’s 
capacity and fragmented its operations, making them 
less effective.
We believe that in the near term the ADB must focus 
its limited resources on areas that contribute directly 
to its mission and on areas where it has competence 
and can complement the work of others. In each the 
Bank must demonstrate excellence and show it can 
deliver results. The Bank should scale down or play a 
supporting role in areas where bilaterals, multilaterals, 
and foundations are taking the lead. Because the Bank 
cannot do everything itself, it must work purposefully 
to develop strategic partnerships with others to 
ensure that Africa’s essential needs are addressed in 
a coordinated manner, making the best use of each 
partner’s competencies. The selection of interventions 
in each country must be client-driven, responding to 
country needs. The Bank must also take into account 
each country’s capacity to absorb and deploy aid 
effectively.
While a sharper focus will be important initially, 
and there will be things that the Bank will not do, talk 
of wholesale abandonment of sectors is misplaced. 
Selectivity is not neglect. The Bank may support 
education, for example, by focusing on vocational 
training, leaving primary education to bilaterals and 
foundations that are already active. It may contribute to 
health outcomes through providing water and sanitation. 
Nor does greater selectivity mean that the Bank will not 
engage with new and emerging issues. Indeed, the Bank 
has an important role in looking ahead, identifying new 
challenges and opportunities. When the Bank has a 


















The Bank has to demonstrate excellence and deliver 
results in its areas of focus, above all in building 
productive capacity and fostering greater integration. 
At the heart of the Panel’s recommendations is the 
need to focus on four key challenges. First, leading 
the effort to give Africa the infrastructure it needs 
to grow and integrate. Second, building the capable 
states that are essential for sustained growth and 
social progress, with additional attention to fragile 
and post-conflict countries. Third, promoting the 
private sector, which will drive economic growth and 
employment, including by lending to them directly. 
Fourth, developing the skills that are needed for 
a competitive economy. We make more specific 
recommendations for the Bank’s role in each area.
Consistent with the mission for the Bank, we recommend that it should 
focus on four interlocking flagship areas of focus that will increase 
Africa’s productive capacity, drive integration, and promote economic 
growth. These areas respond to Africa’s key development challenges 
and to the changing international aid architecture, where the Bank can 
excel and can build institutional synergies:
Investing in infrastructure •	
Building capable states •	
Promoting the private sector •	
Developing skills  •	
These flagships are part of our ambitious longer term strategic 
vision of a focused but fuller service ADB. The key is sequencing. 
To get there, management and shareholders will need to develop 
successive medium-term plans, agreeing what will be achieved, 
when, and how, linking priorities with human and financial resources. 
Existing activities must be refocused and restructured. New activities 
must be carefully developed. Promoting greater equality so that 
women have access to opportunities and to resources and so that 
their voice is heard must be mainstreamed across all these areas. In 
doing this, the Bank must earn the space and resources to do more 
things and to do them well.
The flagships do not operate independently. They are interlinked 
and provide a platform that can support productive capacity in the key 


























































Investing in infrastructure is the 
best way for the ADB to increase African 
competitiveness and capacity across 
a range of productive sectors
Investing in infrastructure
At the heart of our recommendations is that 
infrastructure is the best way for the ADB to increase 
African competitiveness and capacity across a range 
of productive sectors: agriculture, manufacturing, and 
industry. The ADB already has a sharper focus on 
infrastructure operations (figure 6).9 This can be the 
platform in the near term for demonstrating excellence, 
Improving agricultural productivity requires infrastructure, 
skills, and a thriving private sector. Agriculture contributes 
about 30% of Africa’s GDP (with a range of 15–70%) and 
generates some 70% of employment. Its importance as 
a driver of both economic growth and poverty reduction 
cannot be overstated. The majority of Africans live in 
rural areas today, including more than 50% of the poor.1 
Agriculture also has a strong impact on gender equity, 
given the key role of women. 
Africa’s agricultural productivity is low in part 
because of infrastructure. Inadequate irrigation—only 
4% of agricultural land in Africa is irrigated, compared 
with 39% in South Asia—limits yields and increases 
vulnerability to drought and climate change. The lack 
of transport infrastructure linking farmers to markets 
depresses their returns.
Increasing agricultural productivity is complicated 
and challenging. It will require incorporating new skills 
and technologies, expanding access to credit, and finding 
new approaches to overcome the largely unsatisfactory 
agricultural development programs of the past several 
decades. The agriculture challenge is too important for the 
Bank to be absent. Today’s agriculture is largely market-
driven and therefore a private sector activity. The Bank 
should approach it accordingly. Capable states must 
promote the required operating conditions: investing in 
infrastructure, knowledge, research, and skills as well as 
ensuring legal and regulatory frameworks conducive to 
investment and growth. The Bank must connect producers 
to local, regional, and international markets, encouraging 
them to move up the value chain. 
There is a need to balance enhancing economic 
growth by improving smallholder competitiveness in 
areas where potential returns on investment are highest 
with ensuring that farmers and the rural poor can earn a 
living and have enough food.2 Long-term investments in 
soil and water management can enhance the resilience 
of farming systems, especially for people in remote areas 
and those most exposed to the risks of climate change. 
Africa needs a smallholder-based revolution centered 
on food staples but also on traditional and nontraditional 
exports. Biofuels are linking agricultural and energy 
markets. And such emerging economies as China 
and India are boosting global demand, but also their 
production.
Already focused on agriculture are such specialized 
agencies as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
and the International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD) and such major donors as the World Bank and 
United States. The Gates and Rockefeller foundations 
have formed the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa 
(AGRA) with a focus to date on inputs and education. So 
the Bank can best contribute to improving agricultural 
productivity by working in partnerships and contributing 
through infrastructure—markets, conservation, feeder 
roads, storage facilities, and irrigation and other rural 
water programs—and by promoting a better climate for 
private sector agricultural development, including efforts 
to strengthen governance and regulatory frameworks 
and to improve access to credit for small and medium-
size enterprises through appropriate intermediaries. The 
Bank’s private sector window should lend directly to larger 
agriculture ventures, including public-private partnerships, 
to support economies of scale, rural job creation, and 
diversification into higher value-added products. Examples 
include horticulture and downstream processing.
Improving agricultural productivity
Box   
1
Notes
The  1.  2008 World Development Report highlights evidence from China and India showing that growth originating in 
agriculture is three times more effective in reducing poverty than growth originating in other sectors.


























































Africa’s needs for infrastructure 
are huge: the investments required 
to fill key infrastructure gaps are 
estimated at $20–30 billion a year
delivering results, and building a case for an expanded 
role.
We have outlined the challenge of poor infrastructure 
to African productivity, trade, growth, and ultimately 
poverty reduction. More resources need to be deployed 
to address the constraints to trade-led economic growth 
and regional economic integration. In many cases trade 
liberalization in Africa has not itself increased trade, 
largely because of internal barriers to trade and an 
inadequate productive capacity. Africa needs better 
transportation networks to move factors of production 
and products to markets. It also needs safe, reliable, 
and affordable energy and improved information and 
communications technology to enable a competitive 
private sector. Investments in infrastructure must 
support the development of strong domestic markets, 
the integration of regional and subregional markets for 
intra-African trade, and the positioning of a competitive 
Africa in global markets.
Africa’s needs for both national and regional 
infrastructure are huge: the investments required to fill 
Africa’s key continental infrastructure gaps are variously 
estimated at $20–30 billion a year.10 Africa needs these 
investments to grow fast enough to make a serious 
dent in poverty. But infrastructure has been relatively 
neglected recently by the aid community. Official 
development assistance (ODA) to Africa for infrastructure 
declined as a proportion of total commitments from near 
40% in 1985 to 24% in 2005, as expenditures rose in 
the social sectors (figure 7). Most bilaterals followed suit. 
Now the trend may be reversing, with the multilateral 
donors giving more attention to infrastructure. The ADB 
has remained engaged in infrastructure, where it has 
strong experience and has produced good results, 
better than in other sectors and as good as other 
multilateral development banks.11 
Recognizing the Bank’s good performance in 
infrastructure, Africa and the international community 
are looking to the Bank to do more. It has a mandate to 
lead on several key continental infrastructure initiatives: 
it leads the infrastructure component of NEPAD, it hosts 
the secretariats of the Infrastructure Consortium for 
Africa and of the African Water Facility, and it is financing 
the Rural Water and Sanitation Supply Initiative. The 
Bank must leverage its privileged role in these initiatives 
to be more proactive and drive delivery. Being a passive 
partner fielding requests for financing won’t suffice. 
The Bank must take a longer view, defining solutions, 
assessing country capabilities to absorb investment and 
expand capacity, and leading efforts to mobilize and 
structure financing, including that from the private sector. 
Consistent with this coordination and leadership role, a 
larger share of the resources available for infrastructure 
should be channeled through the ADB to avoid 
duplication or waste.
With support from the ADB, NEPAD has broadly 
defined Africa’s infrastructure needs. A first task for the 
Bank is to refine and sequence priorities. It must establish 
the physical gaps in infrastructure: in transport, in ports, in 
access to clean drinking water. It must provide advice on 
how to mobilize more financing for sanitation infrastructure, 
how to tackle energy and telecommunications, and how to 
best involve the private sector. 
Africa, despite considerable energy production 
potential, consumes the least energy per capita in the 
world. This is both a cause and consequence of Africa’s 
poor productivity in the informal and formal sectors. 
Less than 10% of the rural population in Sub-Saharan 



















ADF funds for infrastructure 
have increased
Figure   
6


























































The Bank’s role in infrastructure must 
be seen in its broadest sense, as an enabler 
of productivity and growth, contributing 
directly to results in other sectors
to safe, reliable, and affordable energy is therefore an 
imperative for the Bank’s work in infrastructure. This 
work should extend to the development of policy, to 
the institutional and regulatory framework that will 
encourage private sector participation, and to the capital 
investments in hard infrastructure.
A second task should be to identify the investments 
needed in soft infrastructure to promote trade and 
integration. One example: freight forwarders and 
express carriers, the movers of international trade, are 
a critical complement to trade-enabling infrastructure. 
In fact, transportation costs are more highly correlated 
with the number of competing freight transporters in a 
given market than with the distance to destination. But 
transport providers in Africa must cope with complex 
sequences of operations—from field or factory to 
warehouse, then to overland and sea transit often 
through several borders before reaching the final 
destination.12 The speed and efficiency of the supply 
chains depend not just on hard infrastructure but on an 
array of public and private services: customs agents, 
customs brokers, shipping agents, transport companies, 
and banks. Inefficiency and corruption at the border 
impose major costs on firms. According to one report, 
customs bottlenecks at southern African border posts 
cost the region $48 billion a year.13 It takes only one 
broken link to paralyze trade.
The Bank’s role in infrastructure must be seen in 
its broadest sense, as an enabler of productivity and 
growth, contributing directly to results in other sectors. 
Implementing rural water and sanitation programs can 
improve health dramatically by reducing waterborne 
disease, improve school attendance and performance, 
and support agricultural production.
Through the Bank’s work in infrastructure, it can 
also respond to climate change. Africa is responsible 
for only 3% of world greenhouse gas emissions, but the 
cost of adaptation to climate change could be 5–10% of 
continental GDP. African countries will have to formulate 
and put in place mitigation and adaptation strategies. 
The Bank must factor in the impacts of climate change 


















































Official development assistance to Africa:  
falling for infrastructure, rising for human development
Figure   
7


























































Building capable states must be 
at the heart of the ADB’s work
build infrastructure that can withstand severe weather, 
and manage scarce water resources. (A more detailed 
account is given in annex 3).
Promoting integration will involve considerable 
investment in infrastructure that straddles country 
borders, that serves the interests of more than one 
country. Not easy, cross-border infrastructure requires 
intensive planning and implementation over a period of 
years. It also requires stability and certainty.
The Bank must have an array of instruments to 
meet the infrastructure needs of regional member 
countries. It must proactively and creatively develop 
solutions, introducing new instruments or products 
when necessary. In some cases it may lead with 
concessional resources. In others it may combine 
resources from both public and private windows. In still 
others it may provide technical assistance and capacity 
building in support of regional infrastructure or public-
private partnerships, opening new opportunities for 
improving the supply and quality of a broad range of 
services. 
Given the substantial unmet demand for 
infrastructure and other regional investments and 
the benefits that these investments will bring, more 
resources are needed. We recommend that the Bank 
increase the amounts set aside in the ADF for regional 
investments and provide incentives for countries to 
participate in these operations. It should also combine 
resources from the ADB and ADF windows. 
The Bank should also create a solidarity fund 
wholly focused on promoting economic integration, 
especially through cross-border infrastructure, driven by 
continental and regional priorities. Africa collectively has 
more than $300 billion in currency reserves. Some could 
be invested in projects that would produce a good rate 
of return. As a tangible demonstration of their support for 
Africa’s integration, regional member countries should 
take the lead in establishing the fund, but it could also 
be open to other donors. Experience elsewhere, as in 
the European Union, attests to the longer term benefits 
of such a fund.
Building capable states
A capable state is essential for sustained economic 
growth and social progress. Policy prescriptions and 
the promulgation of rules are of little use without the 
capacity to implement them. Aid is of equally little use 
if there is no project management and implementation 
capacity. Such capacity is particularly lacking in Africa. 
So building capable states must be at the heart of the 
ADB’s work. The recent debt relief gives breathing room 
to countries that previously were heavily indebted; they 
must now avoid inappropriate borrowing and show that 
the resources saved are producing solid development 
outcomes.
The Bank, currently involved in a disparate range 
of governance-related activities, needs more focus 
in its governance work. Its portfolio of governance 
operations is small and lacks clear direction. As an 
African institution and with an elected African president, 
the Bank should play a privileged and distinctive role. For 
that it needs a coherent, more focused strategy.
We recommend that the Bank’s priority should 
be strengthening country systems, particularly the 
institutions responsible for financial management and 
the use of public resources. This would include the 
management of natural resources and the institutions 
and the audit and accountability systems that hold 
governments to account. It would also include 
governance measures that support business and that 
provide a more attractive environment for investment. 
Institutional improvement is critical for sustained, pro-
poor growth and for better delivery of basic services. The 
Bank’s work in governance will be cross cutting and will 
contribute to other sectors by strengthening the financial 
and procurement systems that underpin successful 
implementation of projects and programs. This will be 
a major contribution to expanding Africa’s capacity to 
manage and deploy scaled-up development resources.
The extractive industries in Africa have huge potential. 
But will they prove to be a “resource curse” in the 21st 
century or a development trampoline? The answer 


























































The Bank will have to define a limited 
range of governance interventions where it can 
add real value and demonstrate excellence
resources. The Bank can and must make a difference. 
It should raise its profile in the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) to promote transparency, 
prudent use of revenues, and best practice standards 
for technology transfers and sustainability. The lack of a 
clear lead agency has hindered efficient coordination and 
more effective implementation of the EITI so far. Thirteen 
African countries have now endorsed the EITI principles, 
but many lack implementation capacity. The Bank should 
help them. 
To do this, the Bank first needs to expand its 
expertise in the relevant disciplines of licensing, 
managing, and auditing concessions and to build up an 
international network of financial and legal experts. This 
would be a valuable continental public good. The Bank’s 
longer term objective should be to support all regional 
member countries in proactively embracing the EITI 
for the strategic management of extractive resources 
for sustainable and equitable growth. Willingness to 
adhere to the EITI principles sends an important signal 
to investors, and it should be a prerequisite for any Bank 
private sector financing. But the Bank should invest 
directly in extractive industry projects selectively; if the 
projects are commercially viable, funding will generally 
come from other sources.
As in all its work, responsiveness to country 
circumstances and close coordination and 
complementarity with partners are critical. The Bank’s 
capacity currently is limited, and it will have to make 
clear choices in the immediate future to define a limited 
range of governance interventions where it can add real 
value and demonstrate excellence. 
Its approach must combine lending and non-lending 
activities, encouraging high level dialogue, providing policy 
advice, and identifying and promoting best practice. 
Anchoring this approach should be its participation in the 
APRM process, where it is already collaborating with the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) 
and where it has a standard-setting role in economic 
governance. The Bank should take the lead in financing 
the implementation of APRM recommendations relating to 
financial and resource management and to transparency 
and accountability.
Corruption is a symptom of broader failures of 
governance. Africa is not corrupt; there are in Africa, as 
elsewhere, corrupt people. Tackling corruption demands 
action not just on the continent but by countries and 
companies outside Africa. To be a credible voice on 
governance and corruption, the Bank must start with its 
own operations. It must have a policy of zero tolerance 
for corruption in its operations and should have 
independent monitoring mechanisms to back it up. It 
must sanction those who break the rules.
The Bank must contribute to efforts to restore stolen 
assets and to improve systems and controls that prevent 
leakage. We are concerned about the activities of “vulture 
funds,” which buy debt that has been written down under 
debt relief initiatives and then demand full value. The 
Bank should work with the other development banks and 
national authorities to prevent such predatory activities.
Fragile and post-conflict states represent a 
special state-building challenge in Africa. Here ADB 
engagement is imperative. Countries in conflict 
and other fragile states lose 2–3% of GDP a year. 
Neighboring states suffer too: sharing a border with a 
fragile state can reduce growth by 1.6% a year.14 These 
negative spillovers can destabilize bordering countries 
and hamper regional integration. The costs to the 
international community of dealing with humanitarian 
crises, providing famine relief, and supporting 
peacekeeping operations are huge and increasing. In 
2005 emergency aid in Africa surpassed $5 billion, more 
than 12% of all aid, compared with an average of just 
2% in the 1980s.15 To the extent that these costs are 
met from aid budgets, there is a real opportunity cost to 
productive investment.
The domestic human and financial costs of conflict 
and fragility are clear: poverty rates in these states are 
extremely high, child mortality is almost 2.5 times higher, 
and death from malaria is more prevalent. Despite 
their needs, fragile and post-conflict states receive less 


























































The Bank should have significant 
dedicated funds for post-conflict 
countries, drawn essentially from the 
ADF but also from other donors
there are higher average returns to aid in post-conflict 
countries. Swift and effective post-conflict transitions are 
also critical to regional security. Roughly 40% of post-
conflict countries fall back into conflict within ten years.16
There is an emerging consensus on how to respond. 
The OECD/DAC Principles of Good International 
Engagement in Fragile States highlight that successful 
development depends, at least in part, on a coordinated, 
integrated, and well sequenced package of political, 
security, economic, and administrative interventions. 
The principles recognize that each case is different and 
provide a starting point for the Bank. The purely political 
remains the domain of the United Nations and African 
Union, but increasingly these entities look to regional 
organizations to take a lead in mobilizing support.
The Bank can also build on the success of its 
Post-Conflict Country Facility (PCCF), which allows the 
Bank to mobilize donor resources for use alongside its 
own to help post-conflict countries clear their arrears to 
the Bank. This experience underlines the importance 
of flexibility and partnership, but also the need for 
additional resources to allow the Bank to re-engage 
quickly. The Bank does not currently have funds 
available to provide enhanced support to post-conflict 
states. Its resources are drawn almost entirely from 
performance-driven ADF country allocations, limiting the 
amount that can be deployed. The Bank should have 
significant dedicated funds for post-conflict countries, 
drawn essentially from the ADF but also from other 
donors who wish to increase their contributions to these 
states.
Engagements should be flexible, both in size and 
in the type of intervention, tailored to country needs 
and circumstances. For example, it is important to 
demonstrate quickly the gains from peace: restoring 
some basic infrastructure, helping to ensure basic 
services are available, and providing income-earning 
opportunities for former combatants. Assistance should 
be significant, predictable, and sustained, anchored 
in a medium-term perspective with disbursement 
benchmarks. The aim is to help countries return to 
normal status, a transition period that can last ten years 
or more.
The Bank should also remain engaged in fragile 
states that are deteriorating or in crisis. We do not 
believe that this will create incentives for these states 
to perform poorly. The Bank’s support in these cases 
should be limited financially, but the cost of inaction, of 
not arresting decline, is far greater than the risk of moral 
hazard. The Bank should intervene only in a few select 
areas: building state capacity and systems to manage 
resources, improving transparency and accountability, 
and potentially helping nonstate actors, such as 
nongovernmental organizations, deliver critical basic 
services that the government is not delivering. These 
areas clearly build on and reinforce the priorities already 
laid out for building capable states.
In engaging with fragile and post-conflict states, 
the Bank should also mobilize and help coordinate 
international support, establishing divisions of labor 
and complementarity. The United Nations Development 
Program and the World Bank are now developing a joint 
work plan on state-building in fragile states, and the 
multilateral development banks are harmonizing their 
efforts. The Bank must play the leading role in Africa 
drawing on its partnerships with UNECA, the African 
Union, and the RECs. 
Promoting the private sector
We know that business will drive sustainable growth, 
employment, and poverty reduction in Africa. 
Removing the obstacles to private sector development 
and promoting a sound business climate must 
become core objectives in all country and regional 
strategies. Domestic savings and investment rates 
in Africa are low, and foreign direct investment flows 
have declined to insignificance compared with other 
developing regions. There is thus an urgent need to 
improve the investment climate for both domestic and 
foreign investors. The Bank must play a major role in 
promoting an enabling environment for investment 


























































The Bank should play a catalytic role 
by mobilizing finance for deserving private 
sector projects that build productive 
capacity and create economic growth
regulatory frameworks and strengthening governance 
and accountability.
The Bank should develop a differentiated and 
ultimately more effective strategy by fully exploiting its 
integrated public and private structure and broad range 
of instruments. With a more integrated approach, the 
choice of a private or public window becomes essentially 
a technical question: Which financing instrument best 
addresses the particular need? Although recent reforms 
have established a solid base for stepping up the Bank’s 
private sector operations, many institutional arrangements 
must be further refined. The need to improve coordination 
and planning and to learn lessons across the institution 
is evident. The Bank must have the right skills to increase 
its understanding of the African private sector’s needs 
and risks, to be more responsive, and to develop greater 
coherence across departments. The Bank also needs 
a strong credit committee, with the requisite expertise 
in-house, to review what can be technically challenging 
proposals and provide good safeguards.
We considered the possibility of establishing an 
independent structure for direct lending to the private 
sector, such as the International Finance Corporation 
in the World Bank Group. An independent structure 
could enhance focus, professionalism, the recruitment 
and retention of specialists, and the development of a 
“private sector culture.” However, we believe that these 
advantages are outweighed by those of maintaining 
an integrated structure and using all the Bank’s assets 
to support the common objective of private sector 
development. The Bank should instead strengthen its 
private sector department by creating a single point 
of entry for private sector lending and a well-staffed, 
dedicated organizational unit providing leadership, 
visibility, and focus. The Bank now has a range of 
private sector instruments—loans, equity investments, 
guarantees, and syndications—that can be used 
alongside sovereign lending. Examples include public-
private partnerships in infrastructure or pairing financing 
for extractive industries with governance programs to 
enhance transparency and revenue management.
The Bank should lend to the private sector only 
when it can clearly add value. As a development bank it 
can do so to remedy full or partial market failure, capture 
spill-over effects, or promote public goods. It must be 
willing to take on some risk in innovative or potentially 
high-yielding projects. Its financing operations must not 
crowd out or substitute for private financing, but should 
play a catalytic role by mobilizing finance for deserving 
private sector projects that build productive capacity 
and create economic growth. In many cases this should 
be done through financial intermediaries: commercial 
and subregional development banks, microfinance 
institutions, equity funds, or “venture philanthropists” 
that have a strong entrepreneurial drive and are willing to 
bear risk themselves.
The Bank can be an effective, honest broker in 
private sector transactions. It can maximize development 
impact for its regional member countries by ensuring 
that transactions are in line with country strategies, 
that environmental, economic, and social impacts are 
systematically addressed alongside the financial rate 
of return. And it can provide a degree of comfort for 
entrepreneurs, helping mitigate political risk through 
its privileged access to African governments and 
decisionmakers. Investors feel more comfortable with 
the ADB as a co-financier, knowing that the Bank will 
help defend common interests.
The Bank should also increase development impact 
by ensuring that local communities are consulted and 
that they benefit fully from, say, the extraction of raw 
materials. Active and inclusive project design and 
structuring can reduce conflict, ensure that projects 
are a locus for job creation, and provide social and 
economic infrastructure while preserving environmental 
sustainability. Helping firms move into processing natural 
resources will enhance these opportunities, much as 
Botswana has done with diamonds, cutting and polishing 
gems in-country rather than exporting raw stones.
Direct support from the Bank can add considerable 
value in several areas. Infrastructure and agriculture were 


























































African countries must become active 
in encouraging African innovation
the development of more robust banking and financial 
services and foster innovation.
Supporting banking and financial services. To grow, 
the African private sector needs more robust financial 
and capital markets. Banking systems in Africa are 
small in absolute terms compared with the rest of 
the world, but also in relative terms, a sign of limited 
financial intermediation and access to credit on terms 
affordable to both households and private enterprises. 
Although African financial institutions have liquidity, they 
are not currently reinvesting funds locally for a host of 
reasons: lack of investment opportunities, unfavorable 
regulatory environments, insufficient internal capacity 
and expertise, and perceptions of high risk. African 
capital markets, where they exist, are inefficient, small, 
and shallow, with limited liquidity.
The Bank must help unlock that liquidity by scaling 
up its efforts. To have the greatest impact, it now needs 
to decide where it can contribute most effectively and 
to adapt its assistance to the local context. Small- 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) represent an 
important vector for growth and job creation but are 
difficult for the Bank to serve directly for reasons of 
scale and capacity. There is a clear case for the Bank 
to use intermediaries closer to the ground—local 
banks, funds, rural credit cooperatives—to ensure that 
these enterprises have access to finance for growth. 
Where existing commercial and microfinance banks 
are effective, the Bank can support their development 
by providing longer term financing, equity, or technical 
assistance. Smaller entrepreneurs also need risk capital 
to go along with debt financing. The Bank should 
support the development of local equity funds that invest 
in SMEs. It should also assist African financial institutions 
to bring down the cost of transferring workers’ 
remittances to the continent and to harness these huge 
flows for development.
The Bank should continue to support subregional 
development finance institutions, which can efficiently 
reach a range of medium-size clients that the Bank 
cannot. The Bank should take equity stakes in such 
institutions and offer more flexible instruments, such as 
revolving credit lines for proven subregional partners. 
The Bank can also promote other nonbank financial 
institutions, including leasing and insurance companies, 
and strengthen local capital market development 
through local currency financing.
Fostering innovation. African countries cannot just be 
takers; they must become active in encouraging African 
innovation, attracting and adapting the best international 
science and innovation to meet the continent’s unique 
challenges. Biotechnology and related life sciences 
can help address tough health and environmental 
challenges. Africa should channel growing scientific and 
entrepreneurial capacity toward life sciences product 
development and commercialization.17 India, China, and 
Brazil have been successful in this. We believe that it 
holds significant promise in Africa too.
Africa has some scientific capacity, with more than 
36,000 full-time researchers in scientific fields. Nigeria’s 
National Biotechnology Development Agency receives 
$263 million a year, while South Africa’s Biotechnology 
Strategy commits more than $300 million a year. But 
the lack of synergy and knowledge flow between 
companies and science and technology actors hinders 
the commercialization of new health technologies, such 
as traditional medicine and diagnostics. Africa must thus 
invest in the modern scientific infrastructure that will allow 
for greater economic competitiveness in the longer term.
One of the greatest market failures facing many 
African countries is the lack of risk capital to support 
the development of innovative companies that have new 
ideas and technologies but do not yet have revenue 
streams. In developed countries this gap is filled by 
venture capital and angel investors. The Bank should 
crowd in private investment to support the development 
of knowledge-based and innovating economies by 
helping to bridge the financing gap for innovating SMEs.
In particular the Bank should support the 


























































We recommend that the Bank focus 
on vocational training, higher education, 
and science and technology
excellence in the health sciences and in energy and 
environmental technologies. There are significant 
potential benefits from strengthening the linkages 
between life sciences and the private sector. These 
centers would facilitate and incubate innovation, 
supporting entrepreneurship and developing 
technologies. But they must do more than develop 
skills. They must enable African countries to capture the 
economic value of their own research and development 
investments by developing the infrastructure to convert 
knowledge into commercial goods and services that can 
meet the needs of national, regional, and global markets.
Developing skills 
Over the past decade, many African countries have 
improved primary school completion rates. The gross 
enrollment rate for primary education in Sub-Saharan 
Africa increased dramatically from 80% in 1999 to 97% 
in 2005.18 They have received strong support from 
donors who have dedicated more than half of their 
education aid to primary schooling and general support 
(policy, research, and teacher training) (figure 8). Though 
much remains to be done, particularly to close gender 
gaps, the trend is positive.
But Africa is seriously lagging in higher education—
with constraints on enrollment, mismatched worker 
skills and employer demands, a low retention rate for 
skilled workers, and limited ICT access and literacy. In 
Sub-Saharan Africa the gross enrollment rate for tertiary 
education is around 5%, compared with 23% in East 
Asia and 30% in Latin America.19 In Korea 26% of those 
over 15 have tertiary education, in Ghana fewer than 2% 
do. There are some 228 million internet users in East 
Asia, but only 43 million in Sub-Saharan Africa. 20
The demands of the education sector are so large 
that the Bank cannot address them all, nor does it 
have the human and financial resources to do so. The 
Bank should therefore support the sector in ways that 
complement the efforts of partners, many of which focus 
on primary education, general education support, and 
scholarships for higher education. 
We recommend that the Bank focus on vocational 
training, higher education, and science and technology. 
Well targeted vocational training will better align worker 
skills with the demands of the job market. A key goal 
would be to increase the percentage of secondary 
students receiving vocational and technical training 
in Africa, currently the lowest in the world. Higher 
education, particularly in science and technology, will 
help Africa close the knowledge and technology gap 
and adapt and use modern equipment and processes, 
allowing Africa to link into global supply chains. Studies 
suggest that increasing higher education completion 
rates can boost growth and productivity considerably 
through technology adaptation, entrepreneurship, and 
higher income and savings.21
The Bank has already developed some experience 
and capacity in these areas. A preliminary analysis of the 
Bank’s education portfolio indicates that while lending 
has been fairly scattered, technical and vocational 
training and skills development have been the largest 
areas of concentration, accounting for roughly 37% 
of education lending, with an additional 10% going to 
higher education. It is clear, though, that the Bank will 








Annual average for 2000–05
Secondary education 4% Vocational and advanced
teacher training 6%
Distribution of official 
development assistance to the 
education sector in Africa
Figure   
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The Bank should finance the building, 
upgrading, and rehabilitating of select 
higher education institutions
meaningful role in these more specialized areas of the 
education sector.
To maximize synergies with the other areas of focus, 
we recommend that the Bank should give priority to:
National and regional centers of excellence.  •	
The creation of centers of excellence should be 
supported to promote the harmonization of training 
programs, to provide platforms for scientific and 
technological research and exchanges with non-
African institutions, and to establish networks to 
link students and researchers.
Infrastructure for education.  •	 There is relatively 
little donor support for educational facilities. As 
part of its infrastructure effort, the Bank should 
finance the building, upgrading, and rehabilitating 
of select higher education institutions, including 
research laboratories.
Links to the private sector.  •	 Private investments in 
Africa are often constrained by the lack of local 
skilled and semiskilled labor. Foreign investors 
may resort to expatriate labor, increasing costs 
and limiting the potential development benefits 
from technology transfers and job generation. 
The Bank should link its work in the private 
sector with education and training programs 
that support the use of local labor and develop 
linkages that can add value in country—for 
example, in agriculture and agribusiness, in 













How the Bank 
should work
The Bank must be relevant to the needs of all its 
regional member countries. To do so and to promote 
growth and integration, it must operate as a single bank 
with a distinctive African perspective. It must have at 
its disposal an appropriate array of instruments and 
increased financial resources including an enlarged 
ADF, using net income and the untapped strength of its 
balance sheet. Regional members should also contribute, 
directly or through borrowings. The Bank’s lending 
should reward performance and results. The Bank must 
become an authoritative voice on and for Africa. It should 
leverage its contributions by working strategically 
with Africa’s key partners. It must be allowed to grow, 
building its capacity through a medium-term strategic 
accord with shareholders. Demonstrated increases 
in shareholder commitment will be critical, coming 
first and foremost from regional member countries.
As we have made clear, the ADB in the near term must focus its 
limited resources on certain core areas, demonstrating excellence and 
delivering results to earn a bigger role in the future. Becoming a premier 
institution will require more resources, both human and financial, but 
the Bank can do more today by integrating its financing windows while 
increasing client differentiation, backed by a wider range of products. 
A solid knowledge platform and more effective partnerships will be 
indispensable.
Increase resources and integrate the African 
Development Bank and the African Development Fund
The Bank faces a fundamental mismatch in its financing capacity and 
its clients’ needs. It currently provides financing through two distinct 
facilities: the ADB and the ADF. The ADB has excess capacity, while the 
ADF has excess demand (see box 2).
To overcome this mismatch, the ADB should increasingly be 
managed as one bank, with one set of strategic objectives. It should 
bring together its concessional and nonconcessional windows, 
its sovereign and nonsovereign operations into a coherent whole. 
Resources must be deployed accordingly, and management and 
shareholders must work together to unlock the Bank’s untapped 
financial capacity. There is more that it can and should do in Africa. 










































The stark division between the Bank’s 
two lending windows should be revisited 
to give the Bank greater flexibility
unused (figure 9). It should not be content to invest 
more in the financial markets than in its lending 
operations.
The stark division between the Bank’s two lending 
windows should be revisited to give the Bank greater 
flexibility to blend concessional and market-rate 
resources. It must become more responsive to client 
needs and develop the range of instruments required. 
We note that bilateral donors, and some international 
organizations, already provide substantial resources on 
grant or concessional terms to ADB countries. At the 
same time, a growing number of lower income countries 
have received better credit ratings from the major rating 
agencies, opening for them the possibility of tapping 
international capital markets directly. Ghana is a recent 
successful example.
There is a huge difference between ADF resources 
(grants or highly concessional loans) and ADB resources 
(market or near-market loans). This implies a wide range 
in the middle where a single Bank could leverage its 
capacity by blending resources to meet client needs 
more effectively while respecting debt sustainability.22 
Appropriate criteria on ADB lending to these low 
income countries can be designed to safeguard debt 
sustainability, for example, by ensuring that projects 
generate revenues to provide for future debt servicing. 
The African Development Bank Group is structured 
as two distinct lending windows. The ADB window 
provides “nonconcessional” resources lent at market 
or near-market rates to middle income countries 
(MICs)1 and nonsovereign entities. With a triple-A-rated 
balance sheet, it is strong financially. It has risk-bearing 
capacity to expand lending to MICs and nonsovereign 
entities and to take more managed development risk 
consistent with maintaining its financial strength. 
Because of the current eligibility requirements, 
however, only 15 of Africa’s 53 countries are eligible to 
borrow from the ADB window, limiting its playing field.2
The ADF “concessional” window provides 
soft loans and grants to low income countries. 
Because its resources are highly concessional, the 
Fund must be replenished periodically with fresh 
donor contributions. However, the ADF is small 
and represents less than 5% of total ODA flows to 
Africa. Because the overwhelming majority of African 
countries, including the neediest countries, are not 
eligible to borrow from the ADB, they must share 
this limited pool of ADF concessional money. But its 
resources are insufficient to meet client demands.
Notes:
In reality there is some concessionality in ADB  1. 
lending. Most MIC borrowers pay a higher country 
risk premium when borrowing directly in the 
capital markets.
Using the same eligibility framework as most  2. 
other multilateral development banks, regional 
member countries are grouped in three eligibility 
categories according to per capita income: 
nonconcessional only (ADB), concessional 
only (ADF), or blend (access to both). In Africa, 
there are 13 nonconcessional countries, 38 
concessional countries, and only two blend 
countries. The principle underlying this framework 
is the preservation of debt sustainability. Because 
nonconcessional resources have more onerous 
repayment terms, only the wealthier developing 
countries can tap them. Poorer countries are only 
provided “soft” loans and grants to ensure that 
debt burdens are not too heavy.








Treasury 2% Nonsovereign 3%
The Bank’s unused 
risk-bearing capacity
Figure   
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There are a number of options for 
linking the Bank’s two lending windows, 
and management should explore them
Greater flexibility is justified where countries can 
productively absorb more resources. 
More lending should be directed to subsovereign 
entities, such as municipalities, especially those that 
generate revenue, and to the private sector. As discussed 
earlier, to be effective in its direct private sector and 
nonsovereign interventions, the Bank will need a variety 
of instruments that include loans, guarantees, and equity. 
These instruments should be adapted to the needs of 
private and other nonsovereign borrowers. State-owned 
enterprises and municipalities will have huge financing 
needs to keep up with growing demands for quality basic 
services at affordable prices (electricity, water, sanitation, 
transport). The Bank can use nonsovereign instruments 
to help fill these financing gaps. This effort should be 
tied to strengthening the Bank’s capacity to assess and 
manage nonsovereign risk.
There are a number of options for linking the Bank’s 
two lending windows, and management should explore 
them. Some of the most promising options include:
Eligibility criteria.  •	 The ADB determines eligibility 
for concessional or nonconcessional loans 
based on per capita income, a narrow measure 
of needs. Human development indicators, 
for example, are a more comprehensive 
measure. Measures other than income could 
be considered in setting eligibility for the Bank’s 
two windows and could increase the number of 
countries with access to both.
Lending terms by project type.  •	 Currently 
sovereign lending terms are based on the 
borrower country, regardless of the project. 
Defining lending terms based on the project 
type could add flexibility. For example, projects 
that do not generate revenues directly (poverty 
reduction programs, social sectors) could be 
financed on concessional terms regardless of 
the borrower country. Likewise, projects that 
generate revenues and thus have debt-servicing 
capacity (electricity, water) could be priced on 
market terms.
ADB net income.  •	 Over the past two years the 
ADB window has generated average annual 
net income in excess of $300 million. Given the 
Bank’s current financial strength, we recommend 
that this income be deployed more aggressively 
to support the Bank’s development objectives. 
At the moment there is no compelling case to 
add more to reserves because the Bank’s risk 
exposure is already very conservative.23 There 
are three main options for deploying income: 
increasing allocations to the Bank’s MIC trust 
fund, which provides some concessional 
resources to MICs, increasing ADB contributions 
to ADF, or contributing to a solidarity fund for 
regional integration. More radically, the Bank 
could go even further and carve out a portion 
of the ADB’s unused risk capital to support the 
solidarity fund; these are, after all, resources 
provided for the development of Africa.
At the same time many poorer African countries will 
continue to require significant development assistance, 
and the Bank should be enabled to play a greater role 
through a substantially expanded ADF. This would 
be consistent with the commitments donors have 
already made to double aid to Africa and, with the 
intent at the heart of the Paris Declaration, to provide 
more harmonized development assistance on a more 
predictable, longer term basis in support of country 
priorities. We conclude first that more aid to Africa 
should be provided through multilateral channels and 
second that the ADB should increasingly be the channel 
of choice. Currently the Bank is only the seventh largest 
source of aid for Africa (figure 10). While financial 
resources are not the only measure of the importance of 
an institution, we believe that more aid to Africa should 
be channeled through an African institution. This is also 










































We believe that the performance-
based allocation system is inadequate 
and should be reviewed
The Bank is a credible conduit and can do more 
now. It has a solid foundation, its capacity and 
effectiveness are improving, and it is more client driven. 
The ADF-10 replenishment is fully committed, leaving 
huge unmet demand from countries. Of course, the case 
for more resources must be built on the Bank’s ability to 
generate results on the ground. Delivery on the ongoing 
institutional reform program is therefore imperative: 
greater selectivity, greater flexibility, more capacity for 
country dialogue, and more focus on portfolio quality 
and project implementation to lower transaction costs.24 
If the Bank is to position itself as a leader in budget 
support, large infrastructure transactions, or consortia 
supporting fragile states, it will have to be more 
responsive, with faster decisionmaking.
Reward performance and results—
with an African perspective
As the ADF grows, a strong link between the allocation 
of scarce resources and country performance must 
be maintained, but the way this is done must be 
improved. We have concerns about the current 
performance-based allocation (PBA) system. 
To provide incentives for good macroeconomic 
management, the ADF’s concessional resources are 
allocated annually to eligible countries according 
to a formula that attempts to measure needs and 
performance. Needs are measured by population 
and per capita income (all else equal, more populous 
countries receive more resources and richer countries 
receive less). Performance is measured by a series 
of standardized historical indicators for governance, 
macroeconomic policy, and project portfolio execution, 
among others.
We believe that the PBA is inadequate and should 
be reviewed. First, by adopting performance indicators 
designed to be universally applicable, the PBA assumes 
a common development model that leaves little 
room for country-owned development strategies or 
continental diversity. Second, the assessment of need is 
too narrow. Third, much of the assessment is essentially 
subjective and backward-looking. It measures 
intermediate policy choices rather than results actually 
achieved and relies on data of often poor quality. 
Fourth, the annual allocation cycle introduces an 
unhealthy and unnecessary degree of uncertainty in 
planning and management both for the Bank and for 
borrowers.
There are two other problems with the PBA. One 
is that it does not deal adequately with the needs of 
fragile states and post-conflict countries. We have 
already argued in favor of more resources to meet the 
special needs of these countries. The PBA should be 
adjusted to allow for this. The other problem is that as 
an annual, country-based system, the PBA is poorly 
adapted to allocating resources to regional projects. 
A critical road or rail connection linking a good-
performing landlocked country to a port in another 
good-performer may need to pass through a poorer 
performing country. very big projects, such as the 
Grand Inga hydroelectricity project, can take at least 























Sources of aid for Africa
Figure   
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The Bank must have the ability to finance 
regional projects that cut across different client 
groups and to do more at the subsovereign level
country-level performance will vary during that time. 
The potential benefits accruing from investments in 
regional integration should not be held hostage to the 
worst performer or to annual variations in performance 
by some participants. To lead on regional integration, 
the ADB needs a sufficiently flexible mechanism to fund 
regional projects.
We believe strongly that there should be positive 
incentives to promote economic integration, many of 
which can be regarded as akin to regional public goods, 
as stimuli to better economic trade and environmental 
performance, as essential preconditions for private 
sector-led growth, and as underpinnings of regional 
stability. Where there are good regional projects 
assigned a high priority by NEPAD or a REC and where 
the countries concerned are taking the necessary steps 
to make the investment productive, the Bank should 
drive implementation. We recommend, therefore, 
enlarging and “ring-fencing” the resources available 
for regional projects. We also recommend modifying 
the PBA system to reward countries that contribute to 
economic integration.
In short, a single standardized PBA system is ill 
suited to Africa’s complexities. The PBA should be 
the basis for dialogue on what is to be achieved and 
how—a spur to improvement, not a straight jacket. It 
should reward countries for longer term development 
achievements by basing allocations on the country’s 
track record of achievement and should be less 
prescriptive about the policies and strategies to get 
there. This would leave greater room for differentiated 
approaches that enhance country ownership. The 
resources provided by the Bank should be linked 
to sustainable medium-term economic frameworks 
based on commonly defined objectives and measures. 
They should be insulated from short-term fluctuations, 
particularly those from external shocks. The Bank 
should do the necessary analysis, and in the medium 
term it should develop a more African model, drawing on 
African experience and African analysis of what works 
best and when.
Increase client differentiation to 
remain relevant—with an appropriate 
array of instruments
The Bank has a continental mandate and must remain 
engaged in all its regional member countries, responding 
to a diverse range of country needs. Its guiding principle 
must be to help countries move forward: from fragility 
and post-conflict transition to normative development, 
from low income to middle income status, from aid 
dependency to access to international capital markets 
and investment. It must be relevant to MICs as well as to 
fragile states. 
Differences are likely to grow over time as countries 
with varying capacities deal in their own way with the 
pressures of demographic trends, climate change, 
globalization, and external shocks. This will require greater 
understanding of each market, greater analytical and 
policy dialogue capacity, more appropriate products and 
instruments, greater flexibility, and better management 
capacity. The Bank must also have the ability to finance 
regional projects that cut across different client groups 
and to do more at the subsovereign level. The Bank must 
have, accordingly, a broad array of instruments at its 
disposal and the flexibility to develop tailored solutions to 
concrete problems. 
Project financing, particularly for large infrastructure 
investments, will continue to be a staple of its lending. 
But the Bank should be prepared increasingly to lend 
at the sector level or, where appropriate, to support 
the overall country budget. This is not an easy option. 
It requires agreement on a policy and performance 
framework and a dialogue on the allocation of resources. 
It also requires expenditure tracking and independent 
audit mechanisms. And it requires that borrowers 
have transparent and efficient budget control systems. 
But above all it makes government accountable to 
parliament and to its citizens.
Three criteria should guide the choice of 
instruments: country-owned strategy and the level 
of commitment, country and institutional capabilities 










































MICs expect the Bank to provide 
in-depth knowledge on best practices, 
some degree of concessional lending, and 
streamlined loan conditions and procedures
development performance. Different instruments will be 
appropriate in different country contexts, with a range of 
options for conditionality, policy engagement, tranching, 
and implementation and monitoring modalities. To be 
effective, all will require high caliber ADB in-country staff 
who are able to dialogue with ministers and heads of 
state.
At one end of the spectrum are countries that have 
demonstrated good performance and delivery. They 
have the institutional capacity, country systems, and 
planning mechanisms to take strong ownership and 
make the best use of resources. For them general 
budget support and sectorwide approaches set within 
a common policy framework and buttressed by policy 
dialogue in country may be most appropriate. At the 
other end of the spectrum are poorer performing low 
income countries and fragile states. They need long-
term engagement, predictable aid with complementary 
technical assistance, and policy dialogue. For them a 
more structured project financing approach may be 
most appropriate.
The case of the MICs is instructive. During the 
Panel’s consultations with stakeholders in the ADB, 
MICs made their specific needs very clear. They are 
looking for three things. First, they are looking for 
analysis and policy advice. They expect the Bank to 
be able to provide in-depth knowledge on key topics, 
drawing on best practices from across the continent. 
Second, they expect some degree of concessional 
lending, particularly to address poverty. Third, they want 
streamlined loan conditions and procedures to make 
their dealings with the Bank easier.
The European Investment Bank, for example, 
offers low rates with few conditions. It is not clear to 
the Panel why the same shareholders would endorse 
such conditions at one institution but not another. The 
Bank must react to these needs or lending activity will 
continue to fall, and the Bank will become increasingly 
irrelevant.25 But the MICs must also realize that 
borrowing provides the income that allows the Bank to 
provide advisory and other technical services.
The favorable market conditions and low spreads 
that have given emerging markets unparalleled access 
to credit may not last. The Bank must be able to adjust 
to changing conditions. In addition, the Bank should 
exploit its financial expertise to develop new products 
and risk-transfer mechanisms that create greater stability 
for clients and reinforce development sustainability. An 
interesting option for the Bank to consider is “counter-
cyclical” financing products. Taking various forms, they 
have in common the objective of reducing vulnerability 
to debt stress by insulating loan repayment from outside 
shocks. For a country whose economy is primarily 
based on cotton, for example, linking loan repayments 
to the evolution of world cotton prices (such as reducing 
loan servicing requirements when prices fall and vice-
versa) would create a valuable hedge and be good for 
debt sustainability.
For all its clients the Bank needs to improve its 
delivery and speed up disbursement. It must streamline 
sometimes onerous procedures and conditionality and 
improve client service and responsiveness. The Bank 
has to demonstrate efficiency and effectiveness. We 
recommend management and the board agree on 
targets for improvement.
Build the Bank’s knowledge platform
The Bank must increasingly complement its financial 
services with knowledge services, including analytical 
and policy work. These provide the essential 
underpinnings for new policy initiatives and for the 
Bank’s ability to respond to new challenges. We believe 
in competitive pluralism—in the competition of ideas 
in development. Knowledge is an essential tool for 
effective self-governance. In our discussions with African 
stakeholders, a recurring theme was the need for an 
authoritative knowledge platform to add a distinctly 
African viewpoint to international debates. 
The Bank has already set itself a goal in the 
medium term to enhance its knowledge, research, 
and dissemination capacity and to provide intellectual 










































The Bank’s knowledge platform must bring 
to bear Africa’s existing intellectual capacity 
to generate research and knowledge in Africa
includes country analysis, cross-country comparisons, 
and best practice identification and dissemination, 
including practices for development effectiveness. We 
strongly support this ambition. Achieving it will take time 
and resources. Shareholders must be prepared to make 
the necessary investment. But this does not mean that 
the Bank should do everything in-house. It can achieve 
more through partnership.
The Bank’s knowledge platform must bring to bear 
Africa’s existing intellectual capacity to generate research 
and knowledge in Africa, determined by an African 
agenda. The Bank should engage in issues of regional and 
continental interest and importance: trade, climate change, 
shared resources, and participation in the global system.
This is not a matter for one part of the Bank alone. 
Although orchestrated to a large extent by the ADB’s 
Chief Economist’s Office, building the knowledge 
platform is a matter for the Bank as a whole. It will 
require efforts on two fronts: leveraging external 
sources of knowledge and tapping internally generated 
knowledge. These efforts must be solidly focused on 
what is operationally relevant.
The Bank generates a wealth of knowledge every 
year through its operations across the continent. But 
this knowledge is not systematically captured, codified, 
or disseminated. Nor is it sufficiently valued by the 
institution, and this must change. Having country 
offices staffed with high-quality experts, close to clients, 
understanding the client perspective will help. 
The Bank should be a repository of knowledge, 
able to draw on expertise and ideas from Africa and 
elsewhere, able to synthesize that thinking into policy 
and operationally relevant advice for its regional 
member countries. It should serve as an interface 
between knowledge and practical development 
application, enabling information and expertise to be 
widely and quickly shared. It should also be forward-
looking, identifying and analyzing future development 
challenges, such as climate change.
The Bank’s knowledge platform should draw on the 
considerable knowledge and research already being 
developed across the continent in existing knowledge 
institutions: universities, think tanks, and not-for-profit 
organizations. The Bank should build capacity, facilitate 
virtual networks, and empower existing institutions, 
providing resources for structured relationships to 
exchange staff and knowledge. The Bank should send 
staff to those institutions on short-term secondments 
and bring in researchers and experts on one-year 
fellowships to work on areas of particular operational 
interest. These experts would contribute research, 
mentor Bank staff, help develop policies, and raise the 
Bank’s profile.
Become a voice for Africa
Africa will continue to need support from the 
international community, but it needs to play a bigger 
part in the international discourse. Ongoing debates 
on aid and debt relief, trade, and development policy 
will affect Africa and its relationships with the rest of 
the world. Too often Africa’s voice is absent from these 
debates or is ineffective because it is dispersed among 
small countries with limited capacity to engage. One 
of the Bank’s core objectives must be to ensure that 
African views are taken into account. Its current areas of 
operational focus are a natural starting point for the Bank 
to begin to assert this voice: governance, infrastructure, 
fragile states, and regional integration and trade.
The African Union remains the political voice 
for Africa and heads of state. The Bank should play 
a supportive role, bringing a professional voice to 
development issues. It is well positioned to play this 
role. It can bring a uniquely African perspective, with 
the potential to generate, share, and leverage African 
experiences and viewpoints. It can speak authoritatively 
for the continent. And where appropriate it can 
participate itself, but it should also provide timely and 
relevant advice to delegates representing Africa in 
international fora. The Bank can bring together the larger 
donor community, which gives it an understanding 
of the broader development context. Fundamental to 










































The ADB should be the institution 
that African countries look to for 
guidance and information and to help 
set standards of best practice
countries to have a stronger voice in improving the 
quality of aid and in determining how assistance is 
delivered. 
The Bank should also be an authoritative voice in 
Africa. It should be the institution that African countries 
look to for guidance and information and to help set 
standards of best practice. It should also be proactive in 
advising them on wider international development issues 
and what those issues mean for Africa. The Bank must 
itself become a continental public good. The president 
should give a short account annually to African Union 
heads on the Bank’s work.
Engage in strategic partnerships—to 
achieve more by working together
The international aid architecture is changing rapidly, 
and the Bank must adapt with it. There are more donors 
than ever, a proliferation of multinational, national, 
nongovernmental, and not-for-profit organizations. There 
must be more harmonization and coordination and a 
greater focus on results, working together rather than 
competing. That means being open to new ideas, willing 
to share and cooperate with other players in the field of 
international aid.
There are two basic partnership dimensions 
for the Bank: its fundamental relationships with its 
borrowers and shareholders and its partnerships with 
others in the international community. The underlying 
principle for both is that, to be effective, development 
in Africa has to be led and shaped by African countries, 
and partnerships must be crafted accordingly. The 
principles, set out in the Paris Declaration, are too often 
paid lip service. They need to be implemented, and the 
Bank should take the lead in Africa.
As we have repeated, the Bank cannot do 
everything. Nor should it try. In some areas the Bank 
should play a leadership role. In others it should provide 
indirect support. In still others it can use its convening 
power to bring together support. These choices will 
determine its strategic partnerships with a variety of 
partners.
Continental and regional partners.  •	 At the 
continental level the Bank has a particular role 
in helping to deliver the priorities and programs 
agreed on by Africa’s heads of state and in 
helping to provide the analysis for informed 
decisions. It must work in partnership with 
the AU Commission, the NEPAD Heads of 
State Implementation Committee, the APRM, 
RECs, and the UNECA. Partnerships with 
the RECs will be of particular importance in 
the selection, design, and implementation of 
regional projects. Enhanced partnerships with 
subregional development banks—for example, 
the Banque ouest africaine de développement, 
the East African Development Bank, and the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa—can 
deliver results. They are increasingly important 
regional actors, and the Bank should not be 
afraid to let them lead when appropriate.
Traditional partners.  •	 Relations with traditional 
multilateral and bilateral partners must be 
maintained and strengthened. Strategic 
frameworks setting out areas of complementarity, 
sharing workloads and knowledge, should be 
agreed on by the key donors in Africa. Above all, 
the Bank needs a restructured partnership with 
the World Bank that provides a clearer division of 
labor. Relations with the European Commission 
covering trade, aid, and other policy questions 
should be strengthened. The Bank must be more 
assertive and earn the space to grow. Major 
bilateral donors will continue to be a primary 
source of aid for Africa. Solid partnerships with 
these countries can allow the Bank to be a 
channel for additional resources. The Bank’s 
recent private sector development co-financing 
facility with Japan is a good example of what 
can be accomplished. These must be dynamic 
partnerships regularly refreshed, which they will 










































To become Africa’s premier financial 
institution, the Bank must have greater 
human and financial capacity
Emerging partners.  •	 The Bank can play a role in 
structuring Africa’s partnerships with emerging 
donors to ensure that the continent’s needs 
and interests are respected and best practices 
observed. Specialized vertical funds, such as 
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria, have a narrow focus on thematic 
issues across countries and regions. They 
have grown rapidly in recent years to some $3 
billion a year globally and account for some 
19% of discretionary bilateral aid and 12% of 
multilateral aid. These funds should be seen 
not as a threat, but as welcome partners that 
will allow the Bank to sharpen its operational 
focus on areas where it can best contribute. 
Nontraditional donors have emerged, particularly 
China and India, creating new opportunities for 
South-South cooperation. China presents a 
huge opportunity but also a challenge. It is now 
Africa’s third-largest investor and trade partner. 
Traditional donors can learn much from China’s 
less paternalistic approach to cooperation. At 
the same time it will be important to promote 
transparency in the amounts and terms of aid 
provided and to encourage China to adhere 
to international agreements regarding debt 
sustainability, environmental protection, and 
untying bilateral aid. There has also been a rise 
in the number and importance of foundations 
and other not-for-profit organizations. The Gates 
Foundation is now as big as some of the smaller 
bilaterals, but with more clout in its target areas. 
We previously cited the Gates-Rockefeller AGRA 
as an example of how the Bank can partner 
with these foundations to achieve common 
objectives.
Knowledge partners.  •	 As we already set out, 
enhancing the Bank’s research, analytical, and 
policy-dialogue capacity can be accomplished 
in large part through partnerships with strong 
knowledge institutions in Africa and elsewhere. 
This will allow the Bank to scale up its knowledge 
activities faster and more effectively than building 
capacity exclusively in-house.
Enhance the Bank’s capacity
To become Africa’s premier financial institution, the Bank 
must grow. If it is to progress it must have greater human 
and financial capacity. This role will not be handed to 
the Bank. It must be earned by demonstrating greater 
efficiency and better results. The goal, however, must be 
shared by management and shareholders. The Bank’s 
progress toward the goal must be actively managed and 
monitored within a structured framework.
The Bank is making reasonable progress in 
changing the way it does business. Reinforced country 
and regional departments appear to be improving the 
operational focus and alignment with country-driven 
strategies. The Bank is decentralizing and now has 
country and regional offices to be closer to its clients, to 
improve service delivery, speed, and responsiveness, 
and to promote coordination with other donors and 
drive project implementation. We strongly support 
these efforts and believe that greater decentralization 
will be important for making the Bank a more relevant 
development partner. But the Bank should proceed with 
due care: to be most effective, decentralization must 
be accompanied by appropriate safeguards to prevent 
abuses.
We do not think that the ADB currently has the 
human resources to deliver as it should—a critical 
deficit. Management should prepare a detailed analysis 
of the alignment of human resources with strategic 
orientations while also considering the skill mix required, 
the Bank’s financial sustainability, and the need for 
high levels of efficiency. Africa does not need a bloated 
bureaucracy. It needs a highly effective and skilled 
development institution with appropriate capacity. 
Delivering on regional projects, assisting fragile states, 











































Regional member countries can 
and should be prepared to augment 
the Bank’s financial resources
Our view that the Bank is understaffed is supported 
by comparison with other regional development banks. 
The ratio of staff to projects approved in 2005 was 
roughly 11 for the Bank compared with 20 for the 
Inter-American Development Bank and 27 for the Asian 
Development Bank. Comparing the ratio of staff with the 
number of country clients yields a similar result. 
We strongly believe that management and 
shareholders should develop a medium-term strategic 
accord to build the Bank’s capacity. This accord should 
establish sufficiently specific deliverables and indicators 
to allow performance to be tracked and monitored, but 
sufficiently flexible to allow for updating and adapting 
to changing realities. This framework should allow 
management and shareholders to grow the Bank quickly 
on the basis of a common understanding of objectives 
and deliverables on both sides.
In the near term the broad outline of this accord would 
be continued delivery by management on institutional 
reforms, including business processes, budgeting, and 
human resources. Shareholders must agree to higher 
administrative expenses to build capacity to deliver in 
the flagship areas and in knowledge. The Bank cannot 
be asked to take on new responsibilities and initiatives 
without the resources to deliver. If shareholders expect 
the ADB to play a meaningful role in emerging issues such 
as climate change, they must be prepared to fund it.
We note that the governors have said they will take a 
final decision by May 2008 relating to the Bank’s return 
to its permanent headquarters. It is important that there 
is certainty for the medium term. Uncertainty hurts 
staff morale and recruitment, distracts management, 
precludes investment in adequate facilities, and 
undermines professionalism.
Increase shareholder commitment
The Bank will never have the space and resources to 
become the premier development institution unless 
it has active support from all its shareholders. First 
and foremost are the regional member countries. If 
Africa wants the ADB to be the preferred channel for 
development assistance, countries must make their 
views heard more clearly. If Africa wants the ADB to be 
the motor for development and economic integration, 
eligible countries should borrow from the ADB window 
and demand that it provide the expertise and policy 
advice they want. 
We believe that the regional member countries can 
and should be prepared to augment the Bank’s financial 
resources. There are now MICs with good financial 
standing and considerable capital reserves. There is 
a compelling case for the regional member countries 
to put their resources to work for Africa’s integration. 
As we have already argued, they could take the lead in 
establishing a solidarity fund, fully integrated within and 
managed by the ADB.
Governors have a special responsibility, not simply 
for the direction of the Bank, but to keep their respective 
ministers and heads of state informed. In turn, African 
leaders should reaffirm the importance they attach to 
AU–ADB cooperation. This would trigger a welcome 
shift in African countries’ relations with the Bank—from 
one of simply clients to majority shareholders who see 
it as their Bank and who see the success of the Bank 
as linked to the achievement of Africa’s own goals. The 
Bank’s regional shareholders are its best advocates.
Nonregional shareholders are the primary source 
of capital for ADF, which itself is a very important 
source of finance for low income countries that cannot 
access nonconcessional resources. All have made 
commitments to increase aid to Africa. In keeping with 
declarations of support for African-led development, and 
for harmonization and more effective aid, a substantially 
enlarged ADF would signal their confidence at this 
pivotal time in the Bank’s history. This should not be 
unconditional; they should expect results and hold the 
Bank accountable for achieving them. But they must 
provide the resources to allow the Bank to demonstrate 
that it can do so.
Shareholders acting through the Board of Executive 
Directors represent the highest policymaking body 










































The Bank needs one board where 
all shareholders are represented and 
important decisions are made together
policies. In line with best practice in both the public 
and private sectors, the board must focus on providing 
strategic direction, fiduciary oversight, and monitoring 
performance while giving management its proper 
space for day-to-day implementation. It should resist 
the urge to become involved in micromanaging the 
Bank, say, by allowing smaller projects to be approved 
by management. It should collaborate more with 
management with a sense of collective responsibility for 
achieving the Bank’s goals.
In line with our belief that there should be a single 
bank, we also believe there should be a single board. 
Currently, the ADF is the point of reference for the 
majority of the continent, but its board is dominated by 
the non-African members that give most to the Fund. 
The Bank needs one board where all shareholders 
are represented and important decisions are made 
together. This would reinforce African representation 









e Africa’s moment 
to develop 
and prosper
The Panel’s vision for Africa in 2030 is one of a continent 
that has overcome its major development challenges. 
To do so, Africa needs to build on the positive results 
it has achieved over the past several years. The most 
important challenge is tackling poverty. The percentage 
of Sub-Saharan Africans living on less than $1 a day has 
fallen to an estimated 41% in 2005 from 47% in 1990. An 
increasing number of countries are making strides toward 
the MDGs, with some low income countries (for example, 
Ghana, Rwanda, and Uganda) aspiring to join the middle 
income group and pegging their ambitions beyond the 
MDGs. Yet the continent is still home to some 300 million 
Africans living on less than $1 a day, and Sub-Saharan 
Africa is the only region not on track to meet the MDG 
target for income poverty. Much more must be done.
Africa’s macroeconomic indicators are positive. Real GDP growth is 
forecast to exceed 6% in 2008, up from 4–5% in 2005–06, and more 
than twice the 2–3% of the late 1990s. Underlying this growth are the 
broadening and deepening of markets. Following macroeconomic 
reforms, many African countries benefited from debt relief, evident in 
significantly lower external debt-to-GDP ratios. Inflation, nearly 30% in 
the later 1990s, is below 10% and stable. And while Africa had a fiscal 
deficit of 3.5% of GDP in 1999, it has produced fiscal surpluses since 
2004.
The economic recovery has benefited from better policy 
frameworks and a broadly supportive international economic 
environment including higher oil and mineral prices. Fortuitously, the 
demand for raw materials has improved the prospects for African 
export commodities. On average, the price of oil has increased by 
nearly 30% a year since 2004. The prices of nonfuel commodities, 
led by metals, have increased by over 17% a year on average over 
the same period. Demand is projected to remain high for some time, 
driven by the needs of emerging economies. Many beneficiaries of 
this commodity boom now have significant liquidity and international 
currency reserves. Africa’s reserves grew at a compound annual rate 
of more than 37% from 2004 to 2006—to reach 7.6 months of imports.
The economic recovery has also benefited from a decline in armed 
conflicts across the continent and from an overall improvement in 
governance. Central Africa, including Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, and 







































A1 to greater peace and democracy. In West Africa, 
Sierra Leone is at peace and a reunification process is 
under way in Côte d’Ivoire. After nearly 20 years of civil 
conflict, Liberia elected Africa’s first woman president in 
a transparent election in 2006. There have been more 
democratic transitions of government, improvements in 
the management of public expenditure, and increased 
demands for transparency from parliaments and civil 
society. A unique African program of peer review, the 
African Peer Review Mechanism, has been established, 
demonstrating self-confidence and a willingness to be 
held to account.
The importance of economic integration lies at 
the heart of the African Union and NEPAD agendas. 
Some regional economic communities, such as the 
East African Community and Union économique et 
monétaire ouest africaine, are forging ahead, driven by 
the common interests of their members. Others, such as 
the Economic Community of West African States, have 
played a vital role assisting the heads of state in tackling 
issues of conflict, peace, and security.
New opportunities are also opening for trade and 
South-South collaboration. China and India now account 
for 13% of Africa’s total exports. The rapid rise in Africa’s 
trading with China over the recent past has been 
particularly dramatic. During 1999–2004 the share of 
total African exports to China grew by 48% a year. This 
year alone China-Africa trade is expected to reach well 
over $50 billion. At the recent China-Africa Summit, China 
announced its commitment to double aid and investment 
in Africa over the next three years. A $1 billion fund to 
support Chinese industries investing in Africa has been 
announced and is expected to rise to $5 billion. 
These developments represent significant 
opportunities for Africa. Higher export revenues can, 
with appropriate investment policies, be plowed back 
into diversifying economies. To capture the benefits of 
these opportunities, Africa has to assert its own clear 
strategic interests in these new relationships.
While the quality of Africa’s business climate still 
lags behind other regions, there are signs of progress 
and better prospects for investment. According to the 
Doing Business 2007 report, Africa is the third fastest 
region in the pace of business environment reform, with 
two African countries (Ghana and Tanzania) among the 
top ten reformers worldwide. Similarly, the prospects 
for increased ODA are better today than they have been 
in years. If that aid is directed at growth-enhancing 
areas—such as infrastructure and productive capacities, 
especially in agriculture—it could further boost private 
investment from both domestic and foreign sources.
Remittances to the continent, more stable than ODA 
as a source of external flows, have also been growing 
rapidly—a boost for the continent, but also a sign 
that skilled workers are not finding good employment 
opportunities at home and are going abroad. 
Remittances rose from $58 billion in 1995 to $160 
billion in 2004. ODA flows during the same period only 
increased from $59 billion to $79 billion.
In sum, Africa’s prospects are positive. But it must 
not rest on its laurels. It must take advantage of these 
opportunities to redouble efforts. Increased resource 
flows today—from commodities, aid, and remittances—
must be invested productively to increase economic 













Africans have historically placed a high priority on 
unity through regional cooperation and integration. At 
independence the focus was on political unity and solidarity 
as an antidote to colonial marginalization. But this political 
goal has remained largely unrealized, and many now 
accept that political unity will take decades to achieve. 
This realization, together with the onset of economic 
decline in several African countries in the late 1970s, 
shifted attention toward the economics of cooperation and 
integration. The shift gathered momentum over the past 
decade and a half, and there is now growing recognition 
of Africa’s particular economic challenges and the need 
for greater economic integration to overcome them.
Geographic fragmentation.  •	 Africa’s countries are small relative 
to the rest of the world. Although Africa is the world’s second-
largest continent (30.4 million square kilometers) and the 
second most populous (more than 900 million people), its 
land and people are divided across 53 countries, creating the 
greatest number of states per square area of any continent. The 
average country population is less than 20 million, roughly half 
the world average.
Physical handicaps.  •	 Africa has the highest concentration of 
landlocked countries of any continent. Fifteen African countries, 
home to 40% of Africa’s people, live in countries with no access 
to the sea. These countries are cut off from international trade 
routes and must rely on neighboring countries to get their 
products to international markets or to obtain key imports. 
Another six island nations face challenges related to their 
geographic isolation. These physical handicaps impose 
tremendous costs that make imports expensive and exports 
uncompetitive. Transport costs for landlocked countries are 
42% higher than those for their coastal neighbors, and there is 
a strong and negative correlation between transport costs and 
economic growth.26 In short, physical handicaps are one of the 
key determinants, although certainly not the only one, of poor 
economic performance.
Policy incongruence.  •	 As a result in part of Africa’s large number 










































A2 presents a hodgepodge of policy environments 
covering a wide range of issues key to 
economic growth: trade and customs rules, 
technical standards (for rail transport, electricity, 
sanitation), financial regulations, currency and 
exchange rate regimes, legal frameworks, and 
investment and business processes. Differences 
across these policy frameworks cause “friction” 
for workers, businesses, and entrepreneurs that 
limit opportunities and slow growth.
Economic fragmentation.  •	 Africa’s general 
economic underdevelopment combined with 
these physical challenges has led to economic 
fragmentation. Africa’s economies are small, 
with an average national GDP of about $4 billion. 
Compare that with the world average of $250 
billion. African economies lack critical mass, 
diversification, and scale.
Economic marginalization.  •	 Africa’s share of world 
trade has plummeted to a little over 1% and 
intra-African trade is minimal, only about 10% of 
total African trade. Africa has failed to diversify its 
exports beyond primary commodities, which in 
recent years have been dominated by oil. Foreign 
direct investment flows into Africa have declined 
to insignificance compared with other developing 
regions. Generally infrastructure is poor across 
the continent. If these trends continue unchecked, 
Africa will be cut off from the benefits of expanding 
world trade, stuck on a low growth path.
Unfavorable trade access.  •	 Another important 
barrier to greater African participation in the 
global economy is unfavorable access to 
markets in developed countries. Developed-
country subsidies on agricultural commodities 
such as cotton and escalating tariffs on 
processed goods put a drag on exports and 
discourage diversification.
Taking advantage of globalization
Despite these considerable challenges, there are 
opportunities for Africa to develop faster and take 
advantage of globalization. Africa’s current growth 
momentum provides a platform and an opportunity 
to move forward. The global economy, thanks to 
the emergence of China, India, and other rising 
economies, has improved the prospects for African 
export commodities. The growth of these emerging 
economies is projected to remain high for some time 
to come. This should provide Africa with substantial 
export revenues that, with appropriate investment 
policies, can be plowed back into diversifying 
economies and developing appropriate specializations. 
Similarly, the prospects for increased ODA are better 
today than they have been in years. If directed at 
growth-enhancing areas such as infrastructure and 
productive capacities, ODA could lead to more private 
sector investment from both domestic and foreign 
sources.
However, because most African economies are 
small, a regional approach will be necessary in addition 
to strong policies and programs at the country level. 
This will facilitate the building of larger and competitive 
spaces, providing the scale to allow strong domestic 
firms to emerge and attract foreign investors. A key 
outcome will be a significant increase in intra-African 
trade, made possible by stronger regional infrastructure 
and harmonized trade policies. Economic integration 
can enable cheaper, faster transport of goods and 
services, particularly for landlocked countries, allowing 
the continent’s growth and development prospects 
to improve substantially. It would enable Africa to 
participate fully and capture a growing share of the 
benefits from global trade. With stronger regional 
cooperation and alignment of policy goals, Africa’s 
global voice and bargaining power will be enhanced. 
Over time this would transform the small country 
economies (through infrastructure, communication, and 
trade facilitation) and its largely poor 900 million people 










































A2 How the Bank can make a difference
The ADB’s engagement in promoting economic 
integration will have to be selective, guided by a clear 
and explicit strategic and policy framework. The Bank’s 
Economic Cooperation and Regional Integration Policy 
of February 2000 defined elements of such a framework, 
including a set of principles to guide the Bank. Some of 
these remain relevant and should be revamped using 
lessons from the implementation experience of the past 
few years.
On areas of strategic focus, the Bank has been 
given the leadership role in regional infrastructure under 
the NEPAD framework. Here the ADB must deliver if 
it is to remain credible in Africa. But to do so, it will 
need significantly increased financial resources and a 
central leadership and coordinating role in the proposed 
scaling up of infrastructure on the continent. According 
to recent estimates, Africa will need to invest 5–6% of 
GDP in infrastructure each year to achieve the rates 
of growth necessary to significantly reduce poverty.27 
There is a risk that the funding of infrastructure has 
been spread across too wide a range of multilateral and 
bilateral agencies, which could lead to duplication and 
poor coordination. A well equipped and empowered 
ADB should lead and coordinate by convening and 
chairing a consultative group for regional African 
infrastructure.
In addition to infrastructure, there are other aspects 
of the economic integration agenda that the ADB should 
take on. These include governance, particularly the 
“soft” regional and continental infrastructure necessary 
to complement “hard” infrastructure investments. Trade 
facilitation measures, such as streamlining cumbersome 
customs procedures and harmonizing transport 
regulations, are an obvious example. Clearly, there are 
aspects of the agenda that can best be done by others. 
Effective partnership and coordination, especially with 
African institutions, will be crucial. To this end, the ADB 
should be active in building the capacity of RECs and 













Africa has contributed the least to climate change but 
is likely to suffer the most. Greenhouse gas emissions 
from fossil fuel use in Africa are only around 3% of 
total global emissions. In fact, deforestation and other 
changes in land use, rather than energy use, are the 
main contributors to greenhouse gas emissions from 
Africa. Increased climate variability already affects its 
water resources, land, forests, and biodiversity, and 
these impacts are likely to worsen over time. According 
to the most recent report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change, the cost of adaptation in Africa 
could be as high as 5–10% of the continent’s GDP. The 
challenges to Africa from climate change include:
Reduced food security.  •	 More than 95% of Africa’s agriculture 
is rainfed, making it more vulnerable to climate variability than 
irrigated farming. In some countries the yields from rainfed 
agriculture could be cut in half by 2020. Two-thirds of Africa 
is already desert or dryland, with limited scope for agricultural 
production. Each 1˚ C rise in average temperature will reduce 
dryland farm profits in Africa by nearly 10%. The area suitable 
for agriculture, the length of growing seasons, and the yield 
potential, particularly along the margins of semi-arid and arid 
areas, are expected to decrease, reducing food security. 
Increased water stress.  •	 Three-quarters of African countries are 
in arid and semi-arid zones where small reductions in rainfall 
could cause large declines in river water. By 2020, between 75 
and 250 million people could be exposed to higher water stress 
due to climate change. Water scarcity is even more acute in 
North Africa due to the very high population growth rates and 
already high rates of water use. 
Growing competition for natural resources.  •	 Climate change 
will make some currently populated areas less desirable 
or uninhabitable, spurring migration. Projections suggest 
that the number of people at risk of coastal flooding will 
increase from 1 million in 1990 to 70 million in 2080. Drought 



























A3 interdependence and competition for farmland. 
If not managed, this could spark conflict and 
violence.
Higher risk of disease.  •	 Africa is already 
vulnerable to climate-sensitive diseases, such 
as Rift valley Fever and cholera. The Stern 
Review on the Economics of Climate Change 
estimates that with a 2º C rise in temperature, 
40–60 million more people will be exposed to 
malaria in Africa, putting even more stress on 
already weak healthcare systems.
From mitigation to adaptation
Much work on climate change, particularly in developed 
countries, has focused on mitigation (reducing 
emissions). But Africa is a minor contributor to global 
gas emissions and two-thirds of its greenhouse gases 
come from deforestation. Mitigation efforts in Africa 
should concentrate on avoiding land use changes. 
Central Africa has 20% of the world’s remaining tropical 
moist forest, crucial for the global climate.
But even if global carbon emissions were reduced 
tomorrow, Africa would still be faced with adapting to 
climate change. African countries are the least prepared, 
in institutional resources and capacity, to address the 
consequences of climate change or to tap climate-
friendly technologies. Africa needs a cross-cutting 
adaptation strategy covering energy, agriculture, forestry, 
and land and water management.
An adaptation strategy for Africa would allow the 
continent to minimize negative impacts and capitalize 
on opportunities for low-carbon growth and poverty 
alleviation, including multipurpose water storage 
infrastructure, rural biomass for land rehabilitation, bio-
energy and carbon sequestration, irrigation, sustainable 
forest management, and carbon market development. 
The penetration of carbon finance mechanisms has so 
far been very weak in Africa. It is crucial to ensure that 
Africa can access and benefit from these markets.
How the Bank can make a difference
The Bank should help articulate an Africa-based, Africa-
specific vision for climate change issues and a strategy 
to address them. This would include analytical work 
to identify knowledge gaps, assess potential impacts, 
and develop climate change scenarios to aid the design 
and costing of adaptation strategies. The emphasis 
should be on helping African countries shift rapidly from 
managing climate risk as a purely environmental concern 
to addressing it as a growing threat to growth and 
development. The ultimate aim would be to mainstream 
adaptation into Africa’s development plans. The Bank 
can start by explicitly addressing climate change in its 
projects.
The Bank should also help African countries 
build the capacity to analyze climate change and its 
development ramifications. It is crucial to support African 
countries in scaling up efforts to improve and increase 
access to climate and weather data, investing in and 
transferring adaptation technologies for adaptation in 
key sectors, developing and implementing best practice 
guidelines for screening and assessing climate change 
risk in development projects and strengthening cross-
sectoral approaches.
The Bank should lead the charge in raising additional 
resources to cope with climate change. While adaptation 
will require investment across a range of sectors, energy 
will be particularly important. Universal access to safe, 
reliable, and affordable energy is an imperative for 
improving the quality of life, strengthening the capacity 
of African economies to compete in the global economy, 
and reducing poverty. Africa must continue to pursue 
this goal while limiting greenhouse gas emissions. The 
ADB should help Africa develop its largely unexploited 
hydropower and windpower potential. Less than 4% 
of Africa’s hydropower potential is currently used. 
Unlocking this potential will require a variety of actions, 
including changes in regulatory frameworks to promote 










r About the High 
Level Panel 
Process
The ADB High Level Panel was established in 2006 by 
ADB President Donald Kaberuka as an independent 
advisory body to provide recommendations on 
the ADB’s strategic vision and on the operational 
strategies needed in the medium to long term to 
achieve its vision. The Panel started its work in 
October 2006 under the co-chairmanship of former 
President of Mozambique Joachim Chissano and 
former Prime Minister of Canada Paul Martin.
The Panel held its inaugural meeting at the ADB headquarters in 
Tunis in December 2006. This meeting included a discussion with 
the Executive Directors. The Panel held three additional meetings in 
2007 in January (Paris), April (Tunis), and July (Paris). The technical 
team produced background papers for these meetings and circulated 
successive drafts of the report to the Panel members for comment.
In parallel, members of the Panel convened brainstorming workshops 
at the subregional level to seek the insight of African stakeholders with 
intimate knowledge of the Bank. A workshop for East Africa was hosted 
by the Central Bank of Uganda in Kampala in March 2007 and chaired 
by Central Bank Governor Emmanuel Tumusiime-Mutebile. A workshop 
for West Africa was held in Dakar in March and chaired by President 
Soumaila Cissé. President Chissano held a workshop for Southern 
Africa in Maputo in May, and Jean-Michel Severino chaired a workshop 
for North Africa in Rabat in July.
The co-chairs and members of the High Level Panel also interacted 
with governors, ministers, and other stakeholders at the ADB annual 
meetings in Shanghai in May 2007, the World Bank spring and annual 
meetings in 2007, and the third replenishment meeting of the African 
Development Fund in Bamako in September 2007.49
The co-chairs
Joachim Chissano
President Joaquim Chissano served as Head of State of Mozambique 
from November 1986 to February 2005. He was elected President 
in October 1994 and then again in December 1999, announcing that 
he would step down from office in 2004. Between 2003 and 2005, 
Mr. Chissano served as Chair of the African Union. In 2006 he was 
appointed the United Nations Special Envoy to Uganda. He recently 
received the inaugural Ibrahim Prize for African governance.
Paul Martin
The Right Honorable Paul Martin was the 21st Prime Minister of 
Canada and is the Member of Parliament for LaSalle-Émard in 
Montreal, Quebec. He was first elected federally in 1988. Mr. Martin 
served as Minister of Finance from November 1993 to June 2002, 
during which time he was named inaugural Chair of the G-20, an 
international group of G-7 and emerging market nations. Mr. Martin 




Since 2004, Mr. Cissé has served as the President of the Commission 
of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (Union économique 
et monétaire de l’Afrique de l’ouest, UEMOA). In 2003 he served as 
the Commissioner for Mali to the UEMOA. From 1992 to 2002, Mr. 
Cissé served in several ministerial positions in Mali, including Secretary 
General to the President, Minister of Finance and Trade, and Minister of 
the Environment and Urbanization. Mr. Cissé has received a variety of 
distinctions, including Chevalier of the National Order of Mali.
François-Xavier de Donnea
Mr. de Donnea is currently Minister of State and Member of the 
Belgian House of Representatives. He serves as chair or member 
of several intergovernmental delegations and institutes and is also 
Professor Emeritus at the University of Louvain. Throughout his career, 
Mr. de Donnea has served in a variety of roles in public service and 
academia—as Secretary of State for Development Cooperation, 































A5 European Parliament, Mayor of Brussels, and Professor 
of economics and public management at the University 
of Louvain.
Timothy Lankester
Sir Tim Lankester is President of Corpus Christi 
College, Oxford University. Previously, he was Director 
of the School of Oriental and African Studies in the 
University of London. Prior to 1996 he worked at the 
World Bank and in the British Civil Service, serving as 
Executive Director on the boards of the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund and as Permanent 
Secretary of the former Overseas Development 
Administration. He was Private Secretary to Prime 
Ministers Callaghan and Thatcher. He has been a non-
executive director of several major companies. He is 
currently Chairman of the London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine and is the UK Governor for the 
Asia-Europe Foundation.
Emmanuel Tumusiime-Mutebile
Professor Emmanuel Tumusiime-Mutebile has been 
Governor of the Central Bank of Uganda since 2001. 
He was previously Permanent Secretary in the Uganda 
Government for 25 years, where he was the chief 
architect of Uganda’s homegrown macroeconomic 
stabilization and far-reaching structural adjustment 
program, which have led to high economic growth rates 
for two decades and reduced poverty substantially.
Poul Nielson
Mr. Poul Nielson has served in a variety of high level 
public service positions. From 1999 to 2004, he was in 
charge of development cooperation and humanitarian 
aid for the European Commission. Prior to that he 
was the Danish Minister of Development Cooperation, 
Minister of Energy, Head of Section in the Danish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a Member of the Danish 
Parliament. He has also served as Managing Director 
of LD Energy, an oil exploration company owned by 
the Danish Wage Earners Pension Fund, and on the 
Board of Directors of vestas, the leading wind turbine 
manufacturer. He was also a Member of the UN 
Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Water and 
Sanitation in 2004.
Wiseman Nkuhlu
Professor Wiseman Nkuhlu is the Chairman of Pan-
African Capital Holdings (Pty) Ltd. He previously 
served as Economic Advisor to the President of South 
Africa and as Chief Executive of the Secretariat of 
NEPAD. Professor Nkuhlu has served as a director 
of a number of major companies. He also served 
as Chairman of the Development Bank of Southern 
Africa and as Principal and vice Chancellor of the 
University of Transkei. Professor Nkuhlu has received 
a number of awards, including honorary doctorates 
from the Universities of the Free State, Stellenbosch, 
Cape Town, Pretoria, the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
University, and Witwatersrand and merit awards from the 
National African Federated Chamber of Commerce, the 
Association for the Advancement of Black Accountants, 
and the Black Management Forum.
Ndi Okereke-Onyiuke 
Professor Ndi Okereke-Onyiuke has been the Director 
General and Chief Executive Officer of the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange since 2000. Before that she served at 
the New York Stock Exchange as Exchange Services 
Manager and Systems Consultant. Professor Okereke-
Onyiuke has served on the boards of directors of 
several corporate firms, including Ivory Merchant 
Bank, Cooperative and Commerce Bank, and NAIRA 
Properties Limited. She has received many awards 
for exceptional leadership and academic excellence, 
including most recently the national award of Officer of 
the Order of Niger for distinguished service to the nation.
Judith Rodin
Judith Rodin has served as President of the Rockefeller 
Foundation since March 2005. Dr. Rodin was previously 





















A5 Provost of Yale University. She serves on a number of 
leading nonprofit boards, as well as on the boards of 
AMR Corporation, Citigroup, and Comcast Corporation. 
She is the author of more than 200 academic articles 
and chapters and has written or co-written 12 books, 
including The University and Urban Revival. She served 
on President Clinton’s Committee of Advisors on 
Science and Technology. A member of a number of 
leading academic societies, including the Institute of 
Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences, she has 
received 14 honorary doctorate degrees.
Jean-Michel Severino
Jean-Michel Severino has been the CEO of the 
French Development Agency (Agence francaise de 
développement, AFD) since 2001. He began his 
career as Inspector of Finances at the French Ministry 
of Economy and Finances. In 1988 his interest in 
development led him to the Cabinet of the Minister of 
Cooperation and Development where he occupied 
successive posts as Technical Advisor, Chief of 
Geographic Coordination, and Director of Development. 
Mr. Severino also worked at the World Bank as Director 
for Central Europe and as vice President for Asia in 
1997, shortly before the beginning of the Asian financial 
crisis, which he managed at the Bank in accompaniment 
of the IMF programs. He contributed to the High-Level 
Expert Panel on the System-Wide Coherence of the 
United Nations and is part of the commission on the 
“White Book” on France’s foreign and European policy.
Joseph Stiglitz
Joseph Stiglitz is Professor at Columbia University and 
Chair of Columbia’s Committee on Global Thought. He is 
the co-founder and Executive Director of the Initiative for 
Policy Dialogue at Columbia. He has taught at Princeton, 
Stanford, and Massachuessets Institute of Technology 
and was the Drummond Professor and a fellow of All 
Souls College, Oxford. In 2001 Professor Stiglitz was 
awarded the Nobel Prize in economics and in 1979 was 
awarded the John Bates Clark Award. Stiglitz was a 
member of the Council of Economic Advisers during the 
Clinton administration and served as Council chairman in 
1995–97. He then became Chief Economist and Senior 
vice-President of the World Bank in 1997–2000. He has 
written several textbooks, which have been translated 
into more than a dozen languages. He founded one 
of the leading economics journals, The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives. His book Globalization and Its 
Discontents has been translated into 35 languages and 
has sold more than 1 million copies.
Paul Yuma Morisho
Paul Yuma Morisho is currently Consultant and Director 
of Administration for Globacom Limited. He previously 
served as a Consultant for Group Challenge. Mr. Yuma 
has occupied a number of senior posts at the African 
Development Bank, including Secretary General, 
Director of Organization and Methods, and Advisor to 
the President. He also served on the board of directors 
of the Africa Reinsurance Corporation and as Executive 
Chairman and Managing Director of Air Zaire. His public 
service experience in the former Zaire includes positions 
as Public Inspector for the Treasury and Director General 
of the Road Network Office of the Ministry of Public 
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Tuberculosis. Geneva: WHO.Africa needs a strong development 
bank; the ADB should be that bank. Its 
mission should be poverty reduction and 
development by promoting growth and 
economic integration. The ADB itself 
can have only one driving goal: to be 
the premier development institution in 
Africa. It is not that now and will not be 
immediately; it must first prove itself. It 
should grow over time according to a well 
sequenced plan but must now focus its 
resources and energies on those areas 
that will contribute most to its mission.
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